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THE METAPHYSICS OF HENRI BERGSON

A Criticism according

to the Philosophy of

Borden P. Bowne

By

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A Criticism

Analysis

1 - Strategic points in philosophy according to Bowne.

2 - Points of departure, Facts of experience.

(1) Bergson: Change, movement, becoming.

(2) Bowne: (a) coexistence of persons, (b) common law of reason, (c) world of common experience.

With Bergson impersonal or unpersonal facts prominent, with Bowne, personal facts.

1 - Reality

1 - What is reality? How shall we think of reality?

2 - Bergson says it is duration, that is, real concrete time. This distinguished from ideal or abstract time.

3 - Concrete time or duration the most real, substantial, resistant thing we know. It is the very stuff of reality, the very stuff of the psychical life. (C.E.4)

4 - Nature of duration. It is the continuous progress of the past into the future, it gnaws into the future and swells as it advances. "For a conscious being to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating one's self endlessly". Duration is what each of us apprehends when he reflects on his own conscious life, a process of change in which none of the parts are external to one another but interpenetrate, interpermeate; the past is carried on into the present. There is no repetition but continual creation of what is new.

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5 - This principle of duration in the inorganic as well as in the organic. The universe endures. All is change, flow, continuous becoming. Any other view is due to intellect which deals with the inert, reduces all to the static.

6 - Radical mechanism and radical finalism (the latter being but radical mechanism reversed) are both rejected because they conflict with duration. Bowne's criticism and rejection of mechanism more logical and effective because of his mightier arguments on the personal plane. Their criticisms of Spencer.

7 - Radical finalism rejected as making growth and new departures impossible. Way for novelties left so wide open by Bergson that anything may happen. Capriciousness.

8 - Duration, as very stuff of reality, as creative force or principle, gradually gives place to vital impetus as creative force or principle. Vital impulse or cosmic elan defined. (C.E.87)

9 - Duration as time becomes more and more abstract, formal time. Approaching Bowne's idea of time as a mental form.

10 - Vital impulse or cosmic elan rushing, pushing, shooting out, somehow interrupted. Two currents: ascending, spiritual current; and descending, material current. These two in conflict. Ideal genesis of matter. Creation described and illustrated by rising and falling rockets and rising live steam and falling condensed steam. The vital impulse as a center or continuity of shooting out. (C.E.247-8)

11 - The impersonal nature of all this in spite of the personal terms used. Consequent insufficiency.

12 - Individuality and bodily organism. Bergson's individuality is physical not spiritual as Bowne's.

13 - Intellect and the descending current. Intellect formed to deal with matter. It thinks matter,

14 - Bowne's personal explanation of reality and creation. Active intelligence as only sufficient explanation of reality and knowledge.
Immanence and transcendence of the personal world-ground. Ward's illustration of the immanence and transcendence of the world ground or creator. This Bowne's idea. He does not attempt as Bergson to give a recipe of creation.

15 - Bowne's summary of the nature and sufficiency of personality as world ground. (Metaphysics, p. 111-112)

16 - Bergson's a strung along universe". Pluralistic. Problem of interaction. Bowne's a monistic, personal universe.

17 - Relation of human personalities to the personal world ground. Freedom and necessity in the systems of Bergson and Bowne.

II - Theory of Knowledge

1 - Bergson's theory of knowledge closely related to his theory of reality.

2 - Three faculties of knowledge, instinct, intellect, intuition. Their relation, not unilinear but separate.

3 - Nature of intellect. To think matter. Formed to deal with matter, as inert, static. Snapshots. It cannot know life as living, moving, changing. Intellect and science.

4 - Intuition. By this faculty we know the living, moving, becoming. It is intellectual sympathy. Plunging into the vital current, living rather than thinking or reflecting. Knowing the elan from within rather than externally. This experience rare and brief. In it we are free. From it are formed intellectual concepts.

5 - Intuition of matter. Perception, pure and concrete. Pure perception is in the object, not in us. Bridging the chasm between soul and body, mind and matter, philosophy and science. But interaction possivle only by immanent action of the One, the world ground.

6 - Intuition as self annihilation. False mysticism. Nirvana. Knowledge reduced to undifferentiated feeling.

7 - Bowne's theory of knowledge closely related to his his theory of reality. The universe is intelligible because it is grounded in active intelligence.

8 - Failure of empiricism. No unitary, active, abiding self or ego. Ego rejected by Bergson.

9 - Failure of aprŭorism. Subjectivity and relativity of knowledge.

10 - Bowne's summary of his theory of knowledge. ("Personalism" p. 110-111.) Knowledge by activity of mind according to constitutive and intuitive principles, the categories. Nature of categories (Personalism p. 100-102) Intelligence is fundamental, explains all, even the categories, and is itself inexplicable.

11 - Objective and subjective validity of the categories. Kant's failure by making them only subjective. His relativity of knowledge and agnosticism. Bowne replaces Kant's phenomena and unknowable noumena by phenomena and their cause which is active intelligence and hence knowable as acting, creating.

12 -Bowne does not, as Bergson, limit intelligence and bring in another faculty. His partition of territory between science and philosophy. Knowledge in both territories by active intelligence which includes intellect, sensibility and will. Not different faculties demanded but different purpose of faculties in these two territories. Bowne avoids Bergson's fatal dualism.

13- Knowledge of the living, moving, changing, only by the abiding self. Thought of change vs. change in thought.

14- He rejects bare, meager intellectualism as much as Bergson does. But it is result of superficial use of active intelligence and does not demand another faculty to overcome it. Knowledge of personality by personality, of the living by active intelligence.

III - Change and Identity

1 - Bergson's system has been called the philosophy of change, and he the modern Heraclitus. All is change, flow. Seeming fixity due to spatializing tendency of intellect which reduces all to the static. Powne's recognition of change. Necessity of change.

2 - There is also the experience and idea of identity, permanence. This, too, necessary. The Heraclitics and Eleatics. Truth in both.

3 - Bergson emphasizes change and makes no sufficient provision for permanence. To keep way open for change, progress, novelties, he makes anything and everything possible and probable. All is becoming.

4 - Provision must be made for both change and permanence to satisfy experience. But on the impersonal plane it becomes all one or the other.

5 - Problem can be solved only on personal plane to which Bergson has nor yet come. In personality we have self equality throughout the changing experience.

6 - God's changelessness consists not in ontological rigidity but in the constancy and continuity of the laws of His states and changes. Change and indentity in God as in human persons is found in the extraordinary power of personality.

IV - The Self

1 - According to Bergson the self is furation, it is a succession of interpenetrating states, his two selves in one. (I. P. W.)

2 - Self as snowball. Ego rejected as fiction, a thread to string states on (C. E.)

3 - His self is successive states of consciousness. States of consciousness are the self. Bowne holds states of consciousness and consciousness impossible without a unitary, active, abiding self or ego.

4 - The ego Bergson has put out comes back. He smuggles in the unitary abiding self. His abstraction, continuity, is not sufficient to bind these states into unity. The two selves. Fatal pluralism.

5 - Same conclusion reached by criticism of self as snowball, no unity. A mass of states. No individuality except in bodily organism which breaks to pieces.

6 - Self as snowball weighted by past and self as rill from life current is a determined, necessitated self.

7 - Bowne's self, unitary, active, abiding person, <u>created</u> by the personal world-ground who is free, provides for unity and knowledge and freedom. This self or person may live a superficial, poor earthy life or a deep, rich spiritual life, but it is not two or many selves.

V - Space and Time

SPACE

1 - Is space an aspect of physical qualities of matter or is it a distinct reality? Bowne holds former view, Bergson the latter. "Space is reality with no quality". (T. F. W, 95) But a homogeneous, qualityless, medium or reality is nothing, becomes zero.

2 - Homogeneous, qualityless, space and homogeneous, qualityless, time (abstract time) identified. Hence abstract time is zero. Bowne does not hold them identical or zero. They are not delusions.

3 - Space stripped of all qualities still held real. This would be the fiction of pure being.

4 - In "Matter and Memory" and "Creative Evolution" space is "a wholly ideal diagram", "a mental schema". Thus Bergson approaches Bowne's position of space as form of mental experience. Homogeneous time is called "a diagrammatic design of succession in general". Approaches Bowne's position.

5 - Attempted distinction between abstract space and concrete space. "Outside me" is real or concrete space, "within me" is abstract space. But "me" is not spatial.

6 - Bergson's theory of space manageable only as it approaches Bowne's theory. Space not real, nor a delusion, but is phenomenal, a form of mental experience. Bowne's position. (Metaphysics 153-154)

TIME

1 - Abstract or ideal time, and real or concrete time or duration. Former is bastard time, it is spatial and is reducible to space.

2 - Duration is very stuff of reality, most substantial and resistant thing we know. Duration gives place to vital impetus or cosmic elan. Duration as time more and more becomes form of elan's activity - Approaches Bowne's position. Time a form of mental experience.

3 - Vital impulse becomes more sufficient only as it approaches active intelligence. Will Bergson reach the personal plane?

4 - Bowne's summary of his theory of time as phenomenal reality, a mental form of experience. (Metaphysics 193) This the only tenable position. It saves us from the problems and difficulties of pluralism, and of the One and the many.

VI - Freedom and Necessity

1 - According to Bergson, freedom must be thought of in terms of time, not of space. Domination of spatializing intellect means necessity. We are free when we live, endure, not when we think, reflect. Freedom drops as over-ripe fruit from our whole life.

2 - Freedom as over-ripe fruit in contrast with Kant's and Bowne's idea of freedom as spontaneity, self determination, choice, effort.

3 - Freedom in rare, brief moments when we endure, when we plunge into vital current. This is self annihilation, all determined in us and for us as over-ripe fruit.

4 - Freedom and law.

5 - Vital impulse as limited, finite, determined from without, hence necessitated, which means a system of necessity. Bowne's world ground is infinite and free. It is personal.

6 - Freedom a necessity of thought. Problem of error cannot be solved in a system of necessity.

7 - Freedom a necessity of morality. Problem of right and wrong. Bergson has been challenged to write his system of ethics. What must it be?

VII - GOD

1 - Bergson's belief in God. (LeRoy 224) His idea of God. (C.E.248-249) God as continuity of shooting out, unceasing flow, becoming. An evolving God, without plan or purpose. A limited, finite God.

2 - He is not an atheist, but his idea of God not Bowne's idea. God as Father.

3 - His God is impersonal. Personality means self consciousness and self direction. His limited, finite God is determined, mechanical.

4 - Man not teleologically an end but only a terminal point to date. Both God and man yet becoming. Know not what they shall be.

5 - Bowne's idea of God - Personal, infinite, Father the God of the prophets and of Jesus. Men are His children in whom He is seeking to perfect the filial life.

6 - God has a plan for the whole. His plan is subject to His control. He works freely in His universe.

7 - Optimism and hope are possible. Argument from the incarnation.

8 - This God is knowable as person knows person, and friend knows friend. Fellowship with God.

9 - Yielding to Him is not self annihilation but fulness of personal life and individuality.

VIII - Immortality

1 - Quotations from Bergson, stating his views of life and death. (C. M. 245, 247 note, 269, 271)

2 - Teaching of these passages: Preexistence of souls in vital current as rills in a river. Bodily individuality. Vital current indifferent to soul's bodily existence. Human beings trying to ride down and out-ride physical death. So far not possible. Hope - An everlasting bodily existence, or reabsorption in vital current. Possible re-incarnation in plant, animal or human being.

3 - Downe's idea of immortality. God as person, Father. Human beings His created children. Individuality not bodily but spiritual. Body as instrument of soul. Existence of soul apart from body possible and probable.

III - Bergson and Social Problems

1 - What has he to say of the problems of society, their cause, nature, solution? He has spoken on this subject in his address on the European War.

2 - His address before French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences.

3 - The two currents in conflict. The allies are the ascending, spiritual current, and Germany is the descending, material current. It is conflict of spirit with matter.

4 - "Germany predestined to make the verture". Are not allies also predestined? His system of necessity.

5 - Outlook dark for allies according to Bergson's theory of matter. Spirit has not so far had much success in dealing with matter.

6 - Such doubtless his interpretation of all other social problems, conflict of spirit with matter, two mighty forces, without plan, contending for modus vivendi. Two blind Samsons fighting. Not much hope.

7 - Bowne refers all to a God who is Father. Matter and spirit both are His and He is able to make them work together for good. Human beings are His children. It is the God of Bowne and not Bergson who makes possible the Lord's prayer.

IV - Elements of Value in Bergson's Philosophy

THE METAPHYSICS OF HENRI BERGSON

INTRODUCTION

In the preface of his "Personalism" Dr. Bowne writes these comprehensive words: "The strategic points in our intellectual campaigns lie in our epistemology and metaphysics. Our notions of knowledge and its nature, our conception of reality and causality, our thoughts of space and time - the two great intimidating phantoms - these are the things that decide our general way of thinking and give direction to our thought even in morals and religion". (Personalism, page Vlll).

In accordance with this principle we shall attempt a comparison of the philosophies of Professor Henri Bergson and Professor Borden Parker Bowne. These will be the points of consideration, for these, according to Dr. Bowne, determine all else in philosophical systems. To go into detail would mean to rewrite their philosophies in full.

Points of Departure.

Both men base their systems on experience. Their purpose is to explain, interpret, experience.

Bergson starts from the fact of change, movement, becoming. This must be recognized everywhere. "Change in all around we see". Even what seems the most static and inert is found to change. Science now holds that atoms and electrons, its final divisions of matter, are not inert particles but centers of change, movement, action. From this universal fact of experience as fun-

damental Bergson starts to work out his system which is called "The Philosophy of Change". He has been called the modern Heraclitus. We can see something of the end from the beginning.

Bowne takes as the fundamental facts of experience for his starting point: (1) The coexistence of persons, (2) The law of reason, valid for all and binding upon all, (3) A world of common experience, actual or possible, where we meet in mutual understanding and where the great business of life goes on. Here as in Bergson we can see the end from the beginning.

Bergson starts from the fact of change which, in and of itself, is no more personal than impersonal so far as spontaneous thought is concerned. It is not as a personal fact that Bergson recognizes it but rather as impersonal or at best unpersonal. Nor has he yet reached personality as the fundamental cause of this change, movement, becoming.

Bowne starts with the personal and ends with the personal as the only sufficient explanation of experience, even the fact of change, which he also recognizes everywhere. He once said of Bergson that he had not yet reached the personal plane but was going in that direction and would come to it. Bergson is trying to explain the personal in terms of the infra-personal or supra-personal. Bowne holds that the personal, the supreme fact of experience, can be explained only in terms of the personal. The outstanding terms in Bergson's system are "change", "movement," "becoming", "creative evolution", "duration", "vital impulse", "intuition"; in Bowne's system, "personal", "personality", "active intelligence", "personalism".

I. Theory of Reality

What is reality? What is the fundamental or causal ground of the facts of experience? How shall we think of reality? Bergson would answer that it is duration, that is, concrete or real time, which must be distinguished from abstract or mathematical time. The former is the very stuff and cause of everything. The latter is inefficient, it is formal.

Of real time or duration he says, "There is no stuff more resistant nor more substantial". "It is just the stuff the psychical life is made of". Our duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if it were there would never be anything but the present - no prolonging the past into the actual, no evolution, no concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances. And as the past grows without ceasing so also there is no limit to its preservation". "My mental state as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates; it goes on increasing --- rolling upon itself as a snowball on the snow - - - the past follows us at every instant; all that we have felt, thought, and willed from our earliest infancy is there leaning over the present whcih is about to join it, pressing against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside. What are we in fact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history we have lived from our birth - nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions?" "For a conscious being to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating one's self endlessly." "Continuity

of change, preservation of the past in the present, real duration - the living being seems to share these attributes with consciousness. Can we go further and say that life, like conscious activity, is invention, is increasing creation?" His idea of duration is what each of us is said to apprehend when he reflects on his own conscious life, a process of change in which none of the parts are external to one another, but interpenetrating, interpermeating, where the past is carried on into the present, where therefore there is no repetition, but a continual creation of what is new.

As the organic endures so does the inorganic endure. "Succession is an undeniable fact even in the material world, as if it occupied duration like our own. If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water I must willy nilly wait until the sugar melts. This fact is big with meaning." "The universe endures." (Creative Evolution, pages 2, 4, 5, 7, 9-10, 23). Duration, i.e., real, concrete time, bites into things, leaves on them its marks. It is real, for that which does something is real. What does nothing is nothing. Duration is creative evolution. From this it is seen that Bergson explains change, movement, becoming, creative evolution as duration, duration is the efficient agent. It produces all things. It is reality. Reality is not solid matter nor thinking mind but duration, creating, evolving. Life is duration. All is unceasing becoming which preserves the past and creates the present. The solid things which seem to abide, to resist the flowing, the biting, of duration, are periods, cuts across the flowing, views, snapshots, which the intellect takes of the ceaselessly moving, flowing reality for practical purposes, for eventual action. This

is the characteristic of intellect. It is for action. It has been produced by the mind to deal with matter in this practical way. Duration, life, is more than intellect. Intellect is its instrument. It relates to the past, the done not the doing. It is reflective, dealing with the has been, not the being, the created not the creating, the inert, not the living, moving, becoming. Duration, this real, concrete time, this living, moving, changing, becoming process and force, flowing, rushing, pushing on, this creative evolution, produces all things. It is absolute, a flowing that is continuous through all, in all, over all. It is never repeated, is irreversible, always present. Duration or concrete time is the most real, persistent, substantial stuff we know. In it and through it and of it all persons and things have their being. Real time as duration is causal, productive.

Radical mechanism and radical finalism (the latter, he says, is but radical mechanism reversed) are rejected, because they conflict with duration. In mechanism of either form all is given; the only thing that happens is the making explicit the implicit. There are no new departures, no new beginnings, no change, no becoming, no progress. There is only repetition, a shuffling of terms. Physics and chemistry can never explain life. It is interesting to students of Bowne to find Bergson coming to the same conclusion as to the insufficiency of mechanism. But his logic can not be as resistless as Bowne's because he has not the mighty arguments of personalism to put against it. Whatever duration may be it savors of the impersonal and mechanical and can not meet the demands as active intelligence does. As Bowne so conclusively shows, the only producing cause we know or can conceive is personality. But Bergson's duration is not

personality under another name. Bergson would call it supra-personal. It would seem to be infra-personal. It produces personality and all things else. According to Bowne what is not personal is mechanical. To talk of the suprapersonal is to indulge in mere words.

Of the Spencerian system which Bowne so effectively demolished, showing it to be only a verbal shuffle, a fallacy of the universal, merely an ipse dixit of its author, Bergson says: "The usual device of the Spencerian method consists in reconstructing evolution with the fragments of the evolved. If I paste a picture on a card and then cut up the card into bits, I can reproduce the picture by rightly grouping again the small pieces, and the child who, working thus with pieces of a puzzle, and putting together unformed fragments of the picture, finally obtains a pretty colored design, no doubt imagines that he has produced design and color. So by combining together the most simple results of evolution, you may imitate well or ill the most complete effects; but of neither the simple or complex will you have retraced the genesis, and the addition of evolved to evolved will bear no resemblance whatever to the movement of evolution." (C. E. 364).

This is a clear and excellent putting of the Spencerian method and makes its insufficiency, its failure, evident. But Bergson has not the sufficient metaphysic to put in its place that Bowne had when he exposed the fallacy of Spencer's system. If it requires a person to put the parts together to give the design and color, much more did it certainly require a person, an active intelligence, to produce, to create the original. Real time, pushing and rushing

along, is entirely inadequate even to assemble the parts, far less to produce the original whole in all its beauty of design and color. A person, intelligent and active, is the only force or agency in which we can rest satisfied as sufficient for this.

Radical finalism is likewise rejected as being radical mechanism reversed. The one is pushed from behind, the other pulled from before, and both are equally mechanical and determined. In both cases all is given; creation and production are ruled out as impossible. But he acknowledges he is more friendly to finalism than to mechanism, yet theoretically he is really as much against mechanism in this form as in the first, for both are mechanism to him. However, he talks of motives and refers to the mind's producing intellect to deal with matter. He cannot do otherwise. A system of reality just rushing on without any plan, purpose or direction is worse than a rushing train without tracks or engineer. It certainly would make new departures but of what kind? Bergson's duration or real time pushing along certainly throws the gates of the future open, but so open that anything may happen. Mechanism may have gone to the extreme in closing them for sake of order and law and certainty, but Bergson certainly errs in the opposite direction. But he can not do better, for active, intelligent personality alone can meet the need, and duration is not that. Bowne's system, grounded in personality, can overcome the difficulties of mechanism and open the gates of the future for safe and sane evolution and creation with new departures worth while. Active intelligence works with a plan and purpose, but its plan and purpose are its own and are its own and are subject to its control. It determines the plan and purpose, not vice versa. With Bergson's duration, pushing, changing,

becoming, evolving, finalism in any form is as difficult as the most radical mechanism. Bergson, like Bowne, has felt the limitations and insufficiency of the scientific or mathematical method in delaing with the problems of life. It can deal only with the static, the given, the mechanical, but life is moving, growing, changing, becoming, and a way must be opened in our thought to permit this. So he repudiates science and mechanism as insufficient, as Bowne does, and, to be sure to open the way, he depreciates intellect which inhis mind is wholly identified with science and mechanism. He seizes upon the fact of movement, change, becoming, and gives it right of way, turns it loose with no plan or purpose to hinder it. On it rushes without plan or purpose, so that orderly results Bergson would hardly find strewn along the track. No theory of order (C. E. 220), which he is at so much pains and labor to give us, would be able to discover order in what a rushing, pushing system without plan or purpose would produce, unless chaos is order. This certainly is not the straight and narrow way. Bergson's system will not allow plan unless the end is fixed from the beginning, unless all is foreseen, foredetermined, which is mechanism indeed. Nothing less than free personality can solve the problem of finalism and we are conscious every day that it does it and guarantees our freedom thereby. On the impersonal plane it is complete homogeneity or complete heterogeneity, both of which are unmanageable.

As Bergson progresses through "Time and Free Will" on into "Creative Evolution", duration or real time, as the very stuff of reality, the most real, resistant and substantial stuff we know, more and more changes its form or gives place to "elan vital" or vital impulse. Duration at first is interpermeation of states, it is

continuity, it is time. Pure duration is defined in "Time and Free Will" as a succession of qualitative changes, which mingle and interpenetrate, which have no precise boundaries and no tendency to separate from one another, no kinship with number. It is then pure heterogeneity. As soon as we attribute the least homogeneity to duration we introduce space. As Hermann says, "Bergson has a strung-along universe." In the very first pages of "Creative Evolution" we read of "duration gnawing into the future" (pg. 5). This duration bites into things and leaves the marks of its teeth on them. It is more and more forceful and energetic. "The personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing." (pg. 6). "To mature is to create one's self endlessly". (pg. 7). "If I want to dissolve sugar in a glass of water I must willy nilly wait" (pg. 9). "Wherever anything lives there is open somewhere a register in which time is being inscribed." (pg. 16). "The impetus which causes a living being to grow larger, to develop and to age is the same (impetus) that has caused it to pass through the phases of the embryonic life". (pg. 18). This impetus becomes more and more prominent as the generating cause or force until we are fully introduced to it as "an original impetus of life passing from one generation of germs to the following generation of germs through the developed organisms which bridge the interval between the generations. This impetus, sustained right along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed, that accumulate and create new species." (pg. 87). This is the vital impulse. When we come to the greatest chapter of Bergson's writings (C. E. Chapter III) we have this vital impulse, "elan vital", contending

in two surging currents as the creative power or agency. The temporal feature of duration is more and more subordinated, even though the term duration may be retained. The cosmic "elan" clanging, pushing, creating, produces us and all things else. Duration now figures as a form conditioning the creative efficiency of the "elan", very much as, in Bowne, time is the form of inner experience. Duration as time remains as abstract time, a mental form or schema. He does not ascribe consciousness or unconsciousness to this elan. He talks about consciousness in general but does not tell us what he means, for who can tell what it means?

This mighty life current, or vital impetus, rushing, pushing, somehow, we are not told why or how, has been interrupted and turned upon itself and against itself so that there are now two currents, the ascending one and the descending one. The ascending one is spirit. The descending one is matter. The ascending current is as fiery, blazing rockets shooting upward. The descending current is as rockets burned out, black, falling. The rising rockets illuminate and try to revivify and turn back the falling black rockets. So the ascending current of spirit meets the descending current of matter or space, and tries to introduce into it again as much in determination as possible, tries to turn it back, tries to convert it to ascending current again, tries to spiritualize it. These two currents are opposed to one another. Spirit lusteth against flesh, and flesh against spirit. The tendency of the descending current is infra-personal and the tendency of the ascending current is supra-personal. Consciousness and personality as identified with bodily organisms are produced at their point of conflict.

Although HE is seeking to derive personality, yet he is constantly

bringing in the qualities of personality, for only so can he make this cosmic elan sufficient to explain the universe and experience. Duration as real time was not equal to the task and vital impulse has been brought in. Will this, divided somehow into two mighty, opposing, contending currents like two blind giants in conflict, be sufficient to account for all life, thought and personality, all experience? To state the problem seems sufficient answer. Bowne says it never will be sufficient. It is mechanism over again, and Bergson's arguments against mechanism apply against his own system. "This extension, matter, appears as tension which is interrupted. The direction which this reality takes suggests to us the idea of a thing unmaking itself; which no doubt is one of the essential characters of materiality. What conclusion are we to draw from all this if not that by the process by which this thing (ascending current) makes itself is directed in the contrary way to that of physical processes and that it is therefore by its very definition immaterial. All our analyses show us, in life, an effort to remount the incline that matter descends. In that they reveal to us the possibility, the necessity even, of a process the inverse of materiality, creative of matter by its interruption alone. The life that evolves on the surface of our planet is indeed attached to matter. If it were pure consciousness, a fortiori if it were supra-consciousness, it would be pure creative activity. In fact it is riveted to an organism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from these laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of physical changes. It does, however, behave absolutely as a force would behave

which, left to itself, would work in the inverse direction. Incapable of stopping the course of material changes downwards, it succeeds in retarding it. The evolution of life really continues as initial impulsion." (C. E. 245-6 passim). This process of the ideal genesis of matter is compared to "a vessel full of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in its sides a crack through which steam is escaping in a jet. The steam thrown into the air nearly all condensed into little drops which fall back, and this condensation and this fall represent simply the loss of something, an interruption, a deficit. ("The real can pass from tension to extension and from freedom to mechanical necessity by way of inversion." (C. E. 236)." But a small part of the jet of steam subsists, uncondensed for some seconds; it is making an effort to raise the drops which are falling; it succeeds at most in retarding their fall. So from an immense reservoir of life, jets must be gushing out unceasingly, of which each, falling back, is a world. The evolution of living species within this world represents what subsists of the primitive direction of the original jet, and of our impulsion which continues itself in a direction the inverse of materiality, But let us not carry too far this comparison. It gives us but a feeble and even deceptive image of reality, for the crack, the jet of steam, the forming of the drops, are determined necessarily, whereas the creation of a world is a free act, and the life within the world participates in this liberty. Let us think rather of an action like that of raising the arm; then let us suppose that the arm left to itself, falls back, and yet that there subsists in it, striving to raise it up again, something of the will that animates it. In this image of a creative action which unmakes itself we have

already a more exact representation of matter. In vital activity we see then, that which subsists of the direct movement in the inverted movement, a reality which is making itself in a reality which is unmaking itself". (C. E. 247). True, it is evident how mechanical and necessitated all is in this comparison. But he says that the creation of the world, in distinction from this crack and the jets of steam, is a free act. And the dropped arm struggling in vain to rise again is supposed to come nearer the truth and bring out the freedom of it, however the limp helpless arm struggling in vain to rise does not help us to feel or see freedom here. This comparison of the steam jet, the falling arm, the falling rockets are so closely connected with his system that to reject them as mechanical is to reject the system as such. If they are necessitated so is the system. This is all the more apparent when in immediate connection with this he tells us his idea of God and Creation. "If I consider the world in which we live I find that the automatic and strictly determined evolution of this well knit whole is action which is unmaking itself, and that the unforeseen forms which life cuts out in it, forms capable of being themselves prolonged into unforeseen movements, represent the action that is making itself. Now, if the same kind of action is going on everywhere throughout the universe as we have every reason to believe it is, whether it is that which is unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself, I simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a centre from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display - provided, however, that I do not present this centre as a thing but as a continuity of shooting out. God thus defined, has

nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom". (C. E. 248).

The impersonal nature of this God and of the process of creation is so evident, that, in spite of the fact that he refers to it all as unceasing life, action, freedom, it cannot be made personal by words ascribing qualities to it which its nature denies it. If the comparison of the boiler, the crack and the jet of steam was impersonal and necessitated, so surely is this centre of shooting out, this continuity of flowing with worlds dropping as exhausted, condensed steam, this rushing and pushing on, with no direction or purpose except against something that interrupts it and turns it upon itself and again itself. Force and motion which is all we have are not sufficient to constitute personality and explain experience. If it had not been a system of mechanical necessity before, it certainly has been converted into one by this interrupter. If we are looking for freedom and infinity, we must turn to this interrupter, but of this we know nothing. This is the great unknowable of Bergson's system. But it is responsible for the world of persons and things. Here is the real "thing in itself", which cannot be known except as an interrupter. The facts are, that when we begin to look at what Bergson has been telling us in these fine rhetorical passages and beautiful images and word pictures, we discover that we have been treated to a display of verbal fireworks, as in Spencer's famous definition of evolution, which Bowne long ago exposed and demolished. How insufficient this continuity of shooting out is to explain and interpret experience, is evident when we bring to it the world of persons and personal needs. Bergson says, "Creation so conceived is not a mystery: we experience it in ourselves when we act freely." But we are persons, and persons, according to Bergson,

are somehow created or result when these two opposing currents of life, ascending and descending, come into conflict with one another. So that personality and individuality are by him associated with our bodily organisms. (C. E. 269). Personality is a result and not the cause. If this "continuity of shooting out" has personality it is somehow thrust into it by the mighty interrupter which it met, and at the same time it was made a system of necessity. He speaks of this vital current as consciousness in general, but here again he uses a meaningless phrase. It is not until consciousness is identified with personality and individuality that it has tangible meaning, and this does not happen in his system until these two currents are brought into conflict by the interrupter. Bergson is still on the impersonal plane and in the toils of mechanism from which in vain he seeks to escape. The argument he uses against mechanism is applicable to his own system.

To deal with the descending current of matter, the vital impulse or cosmic elan has devised and produced intellect as an instrument which at best deals with it in a very mechanical and superficial way. To say that there was any plan or purpose in the elan's doing this is to introduce finalism, hence mechanism, according to Bergson. Intellect and matter are somehow progressively adapted to one another. But more of this later.

Bowne starts, as we have already seen, with persons and personal relations instead of impersonal movement of change as does Bergson. Personality, active intelligence, according to Bowne, is the only fundamental, substantial reality that we know or experience. Space, time, matter, force, motion are all examined and show themselves insufficient to explain reality or interpret experience. They point beyond themselves for their ground. They must be transcended to be explained. They are entirely trustworthy, but none of them alone nor all of them

together are sufficient to explain reality. So instead of rejecting these as illusions because of their insufficiency, we transcend them to find their cause and the only cause that is sufficient to save them and make them intelligible is personality or active intelligence. They have no meaning in and apart from such intelligence. These are real in the sense that they are not illusions, but they are not real in the sense of substantiality. Hence, Bowne divides reality into phenomenal and ontological. Ontological reality is personal and causal. It is the ground or cause of phenomenal reality. So that Bowne makes the fundamental reality of the universe personal. It is active intelligence, and, as personal, it is free, self-conscious, self-directing, for you can explain the experience of freedom, self-consciousness, self-direction, personality, only by personality. We may transcend personality in imagination but it is vain and empty imagination; it is intellectual caprice. Personality and personality alone, unless we want to deny the trustworthiness of our own experience and pronounce all a delusion, is the fundamental real in which we can rest as sufficient. Active intelligence explains all and it, itself, is inexplicable. Bowne does not attempt to give us a recipe of creation, as does Bergson. He refers it to personality immanent and transcendent and that is as far as we can go. That is sufficient. Ward, in his "Realm of Ends", thinks we can get an idea of creation by an immanent and transcendent creator from the creator and creation of a great literary or musical creation. Bowne would agree with Ward in this illustration. As he himself was wont to say, the immanent and transcendent creator sustains to his creation something of the relation of a thinke to his thoughts. But he is satisfied to have reached personality, ac-

tive intelligence as the world ground and leave all there. Of course here is mystery, but we always find mystery when we are face to face with the fundamentals of life. However there is a choice between mysteries. Bowne thus has a One that is sufficient for all the demands of the many and saves himself from pluralism that more and more must come into Bergson's system before it is workable and, once in, this pluralism makes his system unmanageable, unworkable. Bowne has a wonderful summary of his system in his metaphysics, (pp. 111-112) which must be given in his own language, "That the world ground must be conceived as free active intelligence is the result to which thought continually comes, whatever the line of investigation. If we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we reach a basal intelligence. If we seek to bind the many together in an all embracing system, it is impossible only in and through intelligence. If we seek for unity in Being itself we find it only in intelligence. If we seek for causality and identity in being we find them only in intelligence. If we would give an account of the intelligible order and purpose - like products of the world, again intelligence is the only key. If, finally, we ask for the formal conditions of reality we find them in intelligence. The attempt to define reality itself fails until intelligence is introduced as its constitutive condition. The mind can save its own categories from disappearing, can realize its own aims and tendencies, can truly comprehend or even mean anything, only as it relates everything to free intelligence as the source and administrator of the syten. Against this theistic view there is properly no competing view whatever. There seem to be such views, indeed, but they are really only forms of words, sonorous and

swelling often, but without rational substance. To see this we need only consider the atheistic attempt to refer the world, its order and products, to mechanical necessity. We pass over the deeper logical difficulties involved in this notion of impersonal reality and mechanical causation. We also pass over the epistemological difficulties involved in the problem of error on such a scheme. We say nothing of the puzzle concerning the relation of the human personality to its mechanical ground. We simply point out the emptiness of the doctrine itself when considered as an account of things." This is the brief outline of what Bowne has wrought out and expanded in numerous works. But even in this brief form is evident the sufficiency and superiority of his system as compared with Bergson's system, grounded on a centre or continuity of shooting out, a flowing, rushing, pushing, coming in contact with an unknown and unknowable interrupter which has turned it upon itself and against itself and these two conflicting, struggling currents, without plan or purpose, producing human personalities and all things else. Bergson's system raises more questions than it answers, creates more problems than it solves. To call this current God, free, active, creating, does not in the least make it such or remove the feeling that we have here a radical mechanism, consequently a system of necessity. The only free, producing cause we know is personality or active intelligence. But this is not the character of these currents as Bergson conceives them. Nor can the fine rhetoric and the splendid images in Bergson's works make his system otherwise than mechanical. There are beautiful descriptions and word pictures but these are not explanations. They cannot determine the outcome of his sys-

tem. This is determined by his conception of the fundamental cause of all things, the nature of his fundamental reality. And as this is given us throughout his works but especially as his whole system is summed up in the third chapter of Creative Evolution, we certainly find that his is after all a mechanical system, dominated by stern necessity. A center or continuity of shooting out or flowing is not a person. This is surely what Bowne would reduce Bergson's system to, for in its present form it cannot be otherwise with its pushing forces in real time. Bergson's is a "strung-along universe". The continuity or interpenetration which he finds among the states of consciousness, so that, as the notes of a melody or the ticks of a clock, they melt into one another and are inseparable, he holds to obtain throughout the universe. This continuity runs through all reality. The division of reality into systems and things is an artificial matter of the intellect for practical purposes. These do not exist, all is flow without ceasing. The vital current is continuous in and through all. All is flow, indivisible, inseparable, irreversible. "Strung along" is a fine putting of it. It is James' "stream" idea. Thus it passes along without purpose, changing, becoming, evolving, creating, the ascending current toward spirit, the descending one toward matter and space. Continuity gives unity to this system. Continuity in and among the many holds them together. As continuity binds the states of consciousness together, so continuity binds the universe together. Continuity makes possible the unity and interaction of the many. But what is continuity? It is a pure abstraction. It is not continuity or permeation or interpenetration, but the unitary, abiding personal self that binds the

states of consciousness together. Without active intelligence all goes to pieces. Continuity cannot save the system from breaking up into the infinite many. It becomes more and pluralistic, and the abstraction, continuity, cannot give it unity nor solve the problem of the interaction of the many. Only a unitary, abiding, personal world-ground is sufficient for this, but Bergson's world-ground is not personal. All is becoming. What it may become is unknowable.

Dr, Bowne believes in evolution and continuity but not is a strung along universe in Bergson's sense. His is a monistic universe. The continuity is in the unitary personal ground of all. This unitary personal cause may and does produce, create things, in relation to one another according to the plan of the whole, as the composer of a melody posits the separate notes in harmonious, continuous relation according to a plan of the whole. The composer's mind and not the separate notes of the melody is the continuity, the continuous ground. His mind is the ground of production, harmony, flow and interpenetration. His mind and that alone is the unity that posits multiplicity in harmony. His plan of the whole is his liberty not his necessity. According to this he composes and creates. This plan like the separate notes of the melody is his creation and is subject to his will and change and modification. It is all his and he freely uses it. It serves his purpose. It is all in and of and by his active intelligence. This has meaning only in and for intelligence, apart from intelligence it may all seem like a music box wound up and driven by a mighty, pushing spring grinding this all out, or the movement of the melody pushing itself along in interpenetrating notes, creating itself. But intelligence persists in getting in somewhere, if not in the composition then in the hearing of it, etc.

This comparison represents Bowne's idea of the relation of the personal world ground to the universe. It is freely positing, creating all according to the plan of the whole which is also his creation and subject to his will and according to which he freely works creating in harmonious and intelligible relation. The whole depends upon him constantly. The interaction of the many is possible through the immanent action of the One which is their ground. It is a continuous creation, energized and vitalized unceasingly by this personal cause. New departures are possible and constantly made according to the will of the composer or creator, but these are not capricious, for caprice is not freedom, but they are orderly and harmonious. Otherwise they would be meaningless. Bergson is so anxious to keep the way open for novelties that anything is possible. Unforeseeability does not imply absence of plan except on the impersonal plane. Foreseeability on the personal plane does not imply rigid necessity. This is a fact of personal experience and can be understood only on the personal plane, in terms of active intelligence.

The question will be raised of the relation of human personalities to the personal world ground. As persons we have self-consciousness and self-direction, freedom. This is a fact of experience which cannot be denied without fatal results to thought and morality. We have spontaneity. We can originate plan, determine ourselves. We are personal or we must call all illusion, a vast delusion. Yet with all this we are conscious of dependence, fixity, uniformity. There is what we call the law of our being, our nature. There is in us and around us a world of reality which we find and do not make, which does not depend upon us. We soon discover that

while we live and move and have our own being we do this in a ground that is in us and also beyond us. Our experience is our own, yet we are forced to transcend this experience, transcend ourselves, for the explanation and ground of it all. We are both phenomenal reality and ontological or causal reality. There is in our personality an element of fixity as well as an element of freedom. Our freedom is saved from caprice and made most safe and useful because of this element of fixity, because of this law of our being or nature. We do not find such necessity in this condition that there is no spontaneity, self-determination, choice, plan or purpose left to us. We find the only freedom that is worth while in this arrangement. We even go farther and find our larger liberty in positing plans for ourselves and working according to them. We no more than God are cramped and determined and necessitated by plan and purpose. Law and liberty are not incompatible in either morals or thought. And as we saw, as much as Bergson talks of freedom and seeks to keep the way open for freedom, his cosmic elan is limited, finite and necessitated. Something interrupts it and turns it back upon itself and against itself. In this descending current of matter it finds a limiting power with which it struggles in an effort to revivify and spiritualize it, to introduce into it as much of indetermination as possible. In this it is but partially successful. The black rockets and condensed steam finally fall back in spite of all the efforts of the burning, rising rockets and live steam. So the descending current of matter continues to descend and oppose in spite of all the efforts of the ascending current. This vital impetus could not be thus inter-

rupted and limited were it infinite. No infinite cause or force can be thus limited and necessitated by any finite force. Bergson's God is finite, a primus inter pares at best, not of its own free will and choice but by external necessity, hence his is a system of necessity. Bowne's world ground is infinite, absolute in that it is self-sufficient, all sufficient, self-determining, self-limiting, and only source and cause of all. It is the One upon which the many depend and through which, as their immanent as well as transcendent ground, the many interact. His world-ground is not all and only, as is Hegel's Absolute, nor is it merely primus inter pares as the pluralistic God. It freely posits and sustains all, and, because it is free, it is able and has granted freedom unto human personalities. Nothing less than infinite personality as the free world ground can do this. Any other world ground implies necessity and mechanism.

II. Theory of Knowledge

Bergson's theory of knowledge is closely related to his theory of reality. As we have seen, the cosmic elan, changing, pushing, becoming, evolving, creating, ascending, is interrupted and turned against itself, so that we have two currents, the ascending one or spirit and the descending one or matter, so that knowledge demands the ability to know both matter and spirit of life. The vital impulse has produced three distinct ways of knowing, viz. instinct, intellect and intuition. These three, though related by the continuity of the vital impulse which produces them so that there is some of each in the others, yet are separate, but still are complementary. Their relation is not, as some psychologists hold, first instinct leading to intellect, and thence to intuition. But Bergson holds that the three are separate and distinct productions. The relation between instinct and intuition is closer than that between instinct and intellect or between intellect and intuition. Instinct we see in its highest form in the lower animals, especially in bees and ants. It uses skillfully the tools and means furnished by nature. It does not invent. It does not seek. It is within life and knows it from within, sympathetically, as life. There is a certain element of intellect manifest in instinct at times. Intellect characterizes man as a maker and user of artificial tools, man as a maker and user of machines. Homo faber is the characterization of man as intellectual. It is of man as scientist and machinist. Man as intellectual is dominated by matter, he deals with the material, he is a materialist. He thinks matter. This is the nature and province of intellect. It knows life from outside, knows reality as static, inert. Intuition characterizes life in its highest, spiritual form. Like instinct, but

richer and fuller, it knows life from within, sympathetically. It knows life as living, moving, growing, evolving.

Intellect, he tells us, has been produced to deal with matter, to know matter. It can know life only indirectly and very imperfectly, for it is but a part of life, it is but the instrument of life; so how can it know life? That would be for the part to know the whole, for the chip cast up by the sea to know the sea. It would mean for intellect to transcend itself. For life is infinitely greater and richer than intellect and continually breaks the moulds of intellect and pours over them.

The function of intellect is to know matter, the inert. This is the territory or province of science. How does intellect deal with matter? Kant concluded that there are three and only three alternatives among which to choose a theory of knowledge; either the mind is determined by things or things are determined by mind or between mind and things we must suppose a mysterious agreement. But the truth is, there is a fourth which does not seem to have occurred to Kant - in the first place, because he did not think that the mind overflowed the intellect, and in the second place (and this is at bottom the same thing) because he did not attribute to duration an absolute existence, having put time, a priori, on the same plane as space. This alternative consists, first of all, in regarding the intellect as a special function of the mind, essentially turned toward inert matter; then in saying that neither does matter determine the form of the intellect nor does the intellect impose its form on matter, nor have matter and intellect been regulated in regard to one another by we know not what pre-established harmony, but that intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves to one another in order to attain at last a

common form. This adaptation has been brought about quite naturally because it is the same inversion of the same movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things". (C. E. 205-206).

Although we are told that it is not, this after all seems very like the pre-established harmony between intellect and matter which he condemns in Kant. And although finality is not to be admitted, the production of intellect to deal with matter and adapted to matter seems very much like purpose. Intellect thinks matter. It is adapted to this very thing. It finds geometry in matter because matter somehow finds geometry in intellect. Intellect is reflective, that is, back looking. It sees the done, not the doing; the evolved not the evolving; the already made, not the making; the inert, not the living. Hence, it reduces the moving to the static, the acting to the inert. It cuts up the current of matter into distinct things, by spreading under it the net of space, the meshes of which are larger or smaller, according to its convenience for the purpose of action. Matter is movement, flowing. Separate distinct things do not exist. They are the artificial productions of intellect for practical purposes. Hence, according to Bergson, separate distinct things are illusions. Intellect proceeds by analysis. It can deal with the unknown only in terms of the known. Hence, its knowledge is superficial, external. It can only take superficial, outside views of this current, matter, which it has made into things static and inert. This is the best that intellect can do and it is all that science and everyday affairs demand for practical purposes. In fact, it is all the better suited to practical purposes by this very method or nature. Intellect merely takes snapshots of moving reality. The reality as

moving, living, becoming, creating, it cannot know. When intellect has taken its view or snapshot, reality has moved on and left it. Here is the source of the problems of Zeno and the Eleatics, for intellect reduces all to the static. It cannot know things in motion. Motion is indivisible, but intellect divides it and thus destroys it as motion. Intellect and science are shut up to the mechanical, the already made, the all given. By putting together its views and snapshots and things in infinite number, it can never produce or know living, moving, becoming reality. Thus, Bergson, limits and depreciates intellect. Like Bowne he realizes the limits of science and mathematics in dealing with the living and the problems of life. The function of science is to discover the co-existence and sequence of things and their concomitant variations. This is the province or territory of science and this is all that is demanded of it. This it can do unmolested and unafraid whatever our theory of reality. Evidence is abundant of the failure science makes when it attempts to go beyond this territory into that of philosophy or metaphysics and interpret experience and deal with life. Bergson, seeing this limitation of science and having identified intellect so completely with science, feels that intellect is limited to the province of science and if we are to know life, moving, changing, becoming, it must be by another faculty distinct from intellect, rather than by a different application or use of the intellect as Bowne holds. Hence, Bergson conceives another faculty, viz. intuition, by which we shall be able to know life in the very process of being and creating. This intellect, Bergson holds, cannot do. If it deals with life, the moving becoming, it does so by reducing it to the static, inert. It takes views or snapshots of it. These views are of matter not as flowing but inert, not of duration or time but of space. Hence intel-

lectually we cannot know life, life for the intellect is the unknown and unknowable. By intellect we are landed in scepticism. Back of the phenomena with which intellect deals are the noumena which intellect cannot know. If we are to know this noumenon it must be by some other faculty than intellect, and in some other way than by science. This noumenon or vital impulse as duration is the province of metaphysics. The bridge between has been down sice Kant, according to Bergson. This bridge he hopes to rebuild between science and metaphysics, between matter and life, between intellect and spirit. This he proposes to do by intuition.

Intuition is intellectual sympathy. Intuitive knowledge is the knowledge we have by living experience. It is knowledge from the inside not from the outside. By an act of intellect and will, summoning all our power, twisting the self upon itself from its backward, intellectual, reflective look, we plunge into the flowing stream of the life current, we are merged in it, carried along with it, become of it. It is not thinking but living. We are present with it and in it. We feel, experience, and participate in its duration, its changing, its movement, its creation, its evolution. This experience is rare and brief. In it we are free. We are caught away from the spatial, the material, the superficial, and are bathed in living, moving, becoming reality. Though rare and brief it is by these intuitive experiences that the philosopher, whether he be poet, or prophet, or sculptor, or musician, or metaphysician, sees, feels, knows, experiences life, free, active, creative. He becomes a seer. This knowledge he can impart to others only by the intellectual concepts which he is able to formulate of that living experience, or that experience of living. He has seen and heard and felt that which is unutterable;

it is the ineffable. These concepts by which he seeks to express that experience as best he can are but intellectual symbols of that living experience. But these are seized by intellect and become the coin of its realm and are soon mistaken for the life itself. So that intellect of itself never gets beyond these concepts or symbols which are its whole stock and trade. But for intuition and these intuitive experiences there would be no concepts and but for concepts intellect would be bankrupt.

In "Matter and Memory" Bergson shows how intuition by perception bridges the chasm between mind and matter, between soul and body. Pure perception takes place in the object not in us. By means of pure perception, which is perception without duration or memory, we get so close to matter that we actually slip over into it just as by intuition we get into the life current. So that we experience flowing matter from the inside as flowing. As we became one with the living current, merged in it, we become one with flowing matter, merged in it. We must become matter. This is what Bergson's theory of pure perception certainly comes to. As much as he combats materialism and epiphenomenalism and pyschophysics, he here, by his theory of perception, certainly delivers himself into the hands of materialism. Spirit has gone over into the camp of matter, to spy it out, to learn what it is. This is possible; for they are not such enemies as we may suppose. They are nearer one another than we sometimes think. In fact they differ in degree rather than in kind. Bergson hopes to recover spirit safe from the camp of matter and some how bring matter back with it and thus close up the breach and overcome this unmanageable dualism which is in his system. This he does in a very unique way. To get spirit, by means of pure perception, over into the realm of

matter, he emphasized its close kinship to matter. He talks about perception being in the object and not in us, and about sensations being spatial or having extension, all of which is unmeaning according to Bowne. But once over there he begins to tell us there is no such a thing as pure perception but that all perception is concrete, that in all perception there is duration and memory which is spirit, so after all it was not spirit yielding itself to matter, as matter thought, but matter being overcome by spirit. Thus he has come to know matter and space by intuition and has returned safe to the camp of spirit, bringing matter, fettered and bound, with him. Ipse dixit and it is done. But is it, except verbally? One instant he is in imminent danger of pure materialism and the next, of pure idealism. He cannot reduce matter to spirit, or spirit to matter. He cannot identify the two, so that mind and matter, soul and body are one and the same. Their interaction demands a deeper cause. He is but shuffling words. He is simply vibrating between the two. He cannot in this easy way bridge the chasm which his system has created. When he allowed that unknown and unknowable interrupter to knock his system into a pluralism he at once took upon himself a problem that is found in all his system and which he cannot solve or get out.

Intuition is the process of knowing by plunging into the life current, becoming merged in it. It requires intellect, will and an heroic effort to make the plunge, but, once in, we yield ourselves to the current. Thus we become free, thus we experience duration and truly live. But is not this self annihilation? We are free in the sense that we are silenced, blotted out. Individuality is destroyed. All that is left is a certain undifferentiated feeling.

There is no longer a "me" and "not me". It is a false mysticism in which will, thought, effort, self-consciousness, personality are swallowed up, blotted up. This is Nirvana. It is the Hegelian absolute idealism. There is here nothing of that earnest, persistent, strenuous effort which characterizes the thought, the freedom, the morality of Kant and Bowne. The self of Bergson achieves its richest and fullest reality when it annihilates itself rather than when it most self-consciously, voluntarily and courageously asserts itself. It achieves its freedom by losing itself not by finding itself. There is a true mysticism in which by faithful, voluntary, self-conscious effort we come into personal contact with reality, but we do not plunge into it by plunging out of ourselves. Bergson is a mystic in spite of his protests to the contrary, and his turns out to be that false mysticism which means self annihilation, the yielding ourselves to and being overcome by reality or God. Going in the direction of the intuition or perception of matter, materialism annihilates the self; going in the direction of intuition of spirit the self is annihilated by spirit or the cosmic elan. In both cases knowledge also is destroyed.

Bowne's theory of knowledge is also closely related to his theory of reality. In brief it is this: Knowledge is possible because all is grounded in intelligence; all has been posited according to the laws of mind; what active intelligence has done active intelligence can reproduce as knowledge, active intelligence can know active intelligence. It is in terms of active intelligence, personality, that we must think of the universe of things and the universe of persons and the universe of knowledge, which is all the universe of active intelligence.

Empiricism or sensationalism makes the mind purely passive in knowing. Impressions are made on it from without. Knowledge then is the mere reading off what the mind passively receives. There is no unitary abiding self that gathers up the successive impressions, gives them a meaning and sets them in a rational order. Bowne shows that there can be no knowledge unless there is an active, unitary, abiding self or subject which transforms these fleeting impressions into sensations and rational knowledge. Otherwise all become merely a flux, a fleeting phantasmagoria, leaving no meaning. As Green has done so Bowne shows that apart from an active, abiding, unitary self, fleeting impressions never become sensations or rational knowledge. Bergson's self lacks this permanence, lacks this unitary, abiding, active nature. It is continuous, successive states of consciousness, interpenetrating, as the notes of a melody, and running off in duration. It mechanically rolls upon itself and accumulates in time as a snowball on the snow. He rejects what he calls a "formless ego, indifferent and unchangeable, on which are threaded the psychic states which are set up as independent entities" (C. E. 3). This is his opinion of such an abiding ego and its relation to its states. Bowne's idea is that it is the permanent active ego, not as a thread on which to string already formed states, but as an abiding active person to make these states possible, to make them states at all, give them rational meaning and formulate them into knowledge. Otherwise all is flooded away and there is even no way to know that such flooding is taking place, far less to express it.

Apriorism, on the other hand, holds that the mind may know many things independently of experience. According to Bowne knowledge or experience is not something given ready made from without nor is it

something that the mind independently produces within itself without reference to reality. True, knowledge is actively constituted by the mind within but not independently of the external universe. Objective reference is implicit in thought. There is a world of reality which we do not make but find. Knowledge or experience is possible only through a certain constitutive mental activity according to principles immanent in the understanding. In this way the raw material of sense impressions which are fleeting and discontinuous is built into a rational world of experience. Bowne sums up this theory of knowledge or experience thus: "The world of experience exists for us only through a rational spiritual principle by which we reproduce it for our thought, and it has its existence apart from us only through a rational, spiritual principle on which it depends, and the rational nature of which it expresses". (Personalism, 110). All things exist only in and for intelligence (ibid 111). The personality or spiritual principle, which is the ground of the world of persons and the world of things, posits all according to the principles of intelligence. As we have seen the world of matter, force, motion, space and time is phenomenal, i.e. it exists not of itself, the ground of its being is not in itself, it is real in the sense that it is no illusion or delusion, no fiction of imagination, but it is not real in the sense of self existence, active, it exists only in and through and for intelligence. The ontological, the ground, the causal reality is intelligence. So that the principles of <u>being</u> and the principles of <u>thought</u> are identical. These immanent principles are called categories. These categories have no meaning apart from intelligence and experience. They simply express the way active intelligence works in dealing with the raw material brought to it through sense impressions or immediate

experience of objective reality, for such interaction between the mind and objective reality is possible through the intelligent action of the immanent One, or spiritual principle in which the many are grounded. Thus the mind acting according to its immanent principles truly reproduces for us the world of reality which we do not make but discover. Knowledge is not purely subjective, relative, nor is it passed into the mind ready made. This matter of the categories has been much misunderstood and Bowne has expressed it so truly and well that I must quote at length his own words: "The categories in themselves are simply forms of mental arrangement and merely prescribe the form in which experience is to be ordered. In this respect they are like the rules of grammar which prescribe how we shall speak if we speak at all, but which in themselves have no concrete contents. Living speech, then, is not merely grammar, but definite meaning expressed according to grammatical rules, and when there is no specific meaning the grammar itself moves in a vacuum. All experience, according to Kant, is real only through some given fact, and apart from such fact is empty. Thus we might talk of sensations of a class we have never experienced, as the sensations of a tenth sense; but it is plain that such talk, however learned it might be, would be formal and empty, as there would be no concrete sensation to give significance or substance to our words. In the case of real sensation, on the contrary there is actual experience which gives content to our reflection. Until the actual experience is given there is no security that there is anything whatever corresponding to our formal phases: but when experience is given we have no longer simple logical concepts, but we have something lived and realized. Now Kant said that the categories

are applied only to such sense experience and otherwise are empty. Here he made the mistake of limiting experience to the physical sensations and did not extend his doctrine to the data of self-consciousness. When this limitation is removed it then becomes strictly true that the categories have simply the function of forming and expressing some matter which is directly experienced or which can be assimilated to experience, and apart from that relation they are formal and empty. They must always be brought into contact with experience in some way, in order to acquire reality, or to make sure they represent any possible object for thought. Thus if we talk of the categories of being, unity, identity, causality, substance, etc., in abstraction from any given experience, they are utterly vacuous, so that we cannot tell whether there be any corresponding fact or not; and it is only as we find these categories realized in living experience that they require other than formal meaning, or pass for anything more than purely verbal counters. They are like grammar when there is no speech, or rules for saying something when there is nothing to be said". (Personalism 100-2). Thus we see that the categories apart from experience are empty and experience apart from the categories is an unintelligible phantasmagoria or flux. Categories, like everything else, must be understood in terms of intelligence. Intelligence explains them, not vice versa. Kant, by giving the categories only subjective validity, made knowledge purely relative, subjective, and had on his hands the unknown thing-in-itself which the mind could not get at. The mind can know only the phenomenal, but there is a noumenal which the mind cannot know. The relation between the phenomenal and noumenal Kant never succeeded in defining. Hence the Kantian agnosticism and Spencer's unknowable and transfigured realism.

But Bowne shows that if Kant had been consistent, or thought his problem through, he would have found his noumenon vanishing as a fiction of imagination. What we really have is phenomena and their causes, and these causes turn out to be intelligence. Phenomenal reality and its cause are all that there are, and phenomenal reality has no meaning except in and for intelligence. Hence for us, as intelligent, phenomenal reality is intelligible; and as intelligence we know intelligence, the ontological, substantial, causal reality. When Bowne uses the term noumenal reality or noumenon he means active intelligence. The noumenon or noumenal reality is the ground or cause of phenomenal reality, and phenomenal reality manifests its noumenal cause. Thus we may know the noumenal reality through the phenomenal reality. But even more intimately than this may we as persons know the Personal Cause of the world of things and the world of persons. As person knows person we may know Him.

Bergson rejects mechanism in every form because it conflicts with duration. Bowne rejects it because it cannot explain an intelligible world. The intelligibility of the world and intelligence in us can be explained by nothing less than intelligence or personality as the cause. To talk of something supra-personal is to indulge in words and produce something to which we can give no rational or intelligible meaning. Both the known and the knower demand active intelligence, personality, as their sufficient reason. Bowne finds intellect and intelligence sufficient. He does not, like Bergson, depreciate intelligence and demand another and higher faculty of knowledge to know living reality. The purpose or use of the intellect in science is to discover the relations of coexistence and sequence among things, to ascertain their laws of concomitant variation. This is the pro-

vince of science and this is the work of intellect when it works in this province. But because science is limited to this province, it is a mistake to think intellect or active intelligence is also limited to this province. Intellect is not limited to science. The whole field of reality is open to intellect or active intelligence. Intellect belongs also to the province of philosophy, which province is the interpretation and causal explanation of phenomena. Here the function of intellect is to interpret and to know life as active, living, producing intelligence. Intellect knows living, active, intelligence, personality, not only by its manifestation in phenomena but also directly, immediately. This living, active person is unitary and abiding, even through all change and becoming. "It has a self equality throughout experience: any other conception destroys itself". (Personalism, 103) On the impersonal plane if we admit change all becomes flux; nothing abides; but that cannot be admitted without destruction to self and knowledge. Or if we admit identity all becomes a rigid stare which also makes knowledge and self impossible. This antinomy is soluble only on the personal plane where we can have, as we must have, both change and identity, both becoming and permanence. If the moving, growing, becoming is to be known as such, it can be only by a unitary abiding person or self in which we have both change and identity. "In thought itself there must be no flow. The contents of ideas must remain constant quantities. If there be change in reality the mind must stiffen even the change into fixity. The thought of change must be as changeless as the thought of the unchanging". (Theory of Thought pg. 32) The mind knows the changing only by the fact that while the mind is unitary and abiding it is also growing and becoming, not as a rolling

snowball, which is mechanical, but in that vital way as only living intelligence can grow and become, and which living intelligence alone can know, and know only by experience, but which it cannot explain, for this fundamental. Intelligence, living, active, explains all else and cannot be explained or explain itself, for that would mean to transcend itself, which is impossible except in imagination. Anything else destroys the self and hence knowledge also.

Bergson's theory, by depreciating intellect and creating another faculty, viz., intuition, produces a dualism, a double self, which he never is able to overcome. Bowne, on the other hand, with his theory of phenomenal and ontological reality, and his partition of territory between philosophy and science, all grounded in active intelligence saves himself from that pluralism, and scepticism, and flux of all things, which makes Bergson's system insufficient and unmanageable, and destroys both self and knowledge. The problem of error thus becomes unsolvable. Bowne finds living intelligence acting according to the immanent principles of its nature, the categories, sufficient for the purpose of knowledge. The intellect, the active intelligence, is not limited by these categories any more than a railway train is limited by its track. It is the track that gives the train the only freedom that is safe and worth while. Bergson, by his extreme limitation and depreciation of intellect and the bringing in of another faculty in the interest of knowledge and freedom, destroys self and knowledge. A bare intellectualism which recognizes only part of the self Bowne rejects. Such a separation or division of the unitary, abiding, self is, in fact, impossible. To attempt it except for convenience in thought is to do violence to the self or person. Man is a unit and he is more than bare, meager intellect. It is a misconception of intel-

lect to think of it in such exclusiveness. Feeling and will are also always present. Active intelligence includes the whole self. This is our means of knowing. A superficial, bare intellectualism Bowne as much as Bergson holds insufficient, but he does not set aside intellect and bring in another faculty to get beyond this condition. Active intelligence is sufficient.

Bowne recognizes degrees of knowledge by the intellect. It may know superficially and perhaps does most of the time and this may satisfy the practical demands of common sense even the better. Common sense gets along very well with the visible heavens and knows and cares very little for the astronomical heavens. But this does not limit or hinder intelligence from the deeper and richer insight into life which may be attained, not by the annihilation of self, but by the more earnest, careful and persistent use of intelligence in which the rights and needs of the whole person are recognized. Bowne recognizes that the rigor and vigor method of using the intellect in which it is demanded that everything be demonstrated, is very superficial, for the richest and deepest things of life can never be demonstrated. Logic truly understood does not demand such rigor and vigor. The purpose of logic is to clarify by weighing, comparing, reconsidering. The mind thus proceeding freely can deal with error. But in it all the needs of the whole person are taken into consideration. It recognizes that "man is not only, or chiefly, an abstract speculator, he is also a living being with practical interests and necessities to which he must adjust himself in order to live at all. It has been one of the perennial shortcomings of intellectualism that man has been

considered solely as an intellect or understanding; whereas he is a great deal more. Man is will, conscience, emotion, aspiration and these are far more powerful factors than the logical intellect. Hence in its practical unfolding the mind makes a great variety of practical postulates and assumptions which are not logical deductions or speculative necessities, but a kind of modus vivendi with the universe. They represent the conditions of our fullest life; and are at bottom expressions of our practical and ideal interests or necessities. And these are reached as articulate principles, not by speculative construction, but by analysis of practical life. Life is richer and deeper than speculation, and contains implicitly the principles by which we live. The law the logician of rigor and vigor lays down is this: Nothing may be believed which is not proved. The law which the mind actually follows is this: Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies may be assumed as real in default of positive disproof".' (Theism p. 18). Bowne thus brings to the problem of knowledge, as to all the other problems of life, the whole personality with all its needs. Part of our nature or personality is not cut off and limited as mere intellect for intellectualism and then depreciated because it is insufficient, and then another faculty brought in to help us find the way out and complete our knowledge. Bergson succeeds by dividing the self so that he has two selves. The self of the intellect becomes material and spatial. Materialism here destroys the self. The other self attains its knowledge by a plunge into living, moving reality and thus commits suicide, annihilates itself. Bowne holds to the unitary, active, abiding self which finds its demands satisfied in a world grounded in active intelligence. As personal, it knows not only indirectly through phenomena

but also by sympathy and immediately, though imperfectly, the personal, spiritual World Ground. The One and the Many here meet in the same universe and both are saved. Bowne's theory here passes over into his religion where man the son of God may know God his Father by a deep spiritual experience, by communion of life as person with person, as friend with friend. This is possible and intelligible only in terms of the whole personality. God, the Father, does not, like Chronos, swallow his children, but in this filial relation with God man finds life and in life finds knowledge. Here no doubt is mystery but it is because we are again face to face with the fundamental facts of life. Here no doubt is mysticism but it is not that false mysticism of Bergson in which the self is silenced, loses its individuality, but that true mysticism of the deepest and most intimate relations of life, of person with person, the mysticism in which the self finds its fullest and richest individuality, in which we know even as we are known, in which we see face to face. We see light in His light. Spirit holds communion with spirit.

III. Change and Identity

Bergson's system is called the philosophy of change. He is styled the modern Heraclitus. For him everything changes without ceasing. All is change except the unchanging law of change. Pure duration is defined as a succession of qualitative changes, which mingle and interpenetrate, which have no precise boundaries, no tendency to separate from one another. The vital impulse is a ceaseless flowing, changing, becoming, evolving, creating. All is flux. The seeming fixity and permanence is due to the spatializing tendency of the intellect. It results from considering reality under the aspect of space rather than time or duration which is the true, essential nature of reality. The rigid, the inert, the static are only the result of the practical intellect dealing with matter, which is the descending current. Bowne, like Bergson, recognizes and emphasizes this universal fact of change, nor can we, as Bowne says, conceive of it as merely a matter of qualities and hold that the thing has a core of pure being which is changeless. This core of pure being is a fiction and change goes to the very heart of reality. Change among things means change in things. What seems the most rigid is found to be changing. The scientist gives up his atoms as solid particles and replaces them by vortex rings or electrons, centres of energy and motion. Change in all around, we see. Yea, and find it even in ourselves. Change is a necessary and important principle of life. Thus do we have growth, development, progress. Otherwise all would become stale, barren, dead. Growth, development and progress mean change.

But we have also the idea and the experience of identity or permanence, and we feel sure that permanence somewhere as well as

change is necessary. Thought demands permanence somewhere, it must reach it or perish. If all is change we could never have the idea or experience of permanence, for all would be flooded away. So while the Heraclitics defined the basal principle as becoming, which they regarded as a continuous process, the Eleatics defined the basal principle as being, which they viewed as unitary and changeless existence. The truth is in both of these. There is change and there is identity or permanence, and both must be provided for in our system.

Bergson puts supreme emphasis on the fact of change and makes no sufficient provision in his system for permanence. What of permanence we may seemingly have through intellect turns out to be artificial and superficial, in fact, illusory, as we have seen. But if there is to be permanence, it like change must go to the very heart of being. A superficial, artificial identity is not sufficient. The mind can deal no more with complete homogeneity or all change and unlikeness. In complete heterogeneity we have groundless becoming. Bergson is so anxious to provide for new beginnings, new departures, which are necessary to account for the facts of life which we recognize are not a monotonous repetition of the past, that he opens wide the door for change and novelty. So wide in fact is the ample provision he would make for the new in freedom from the old that not even God himself can tell what is going to happen, indeed anything may happen and miracles may become a commonplace everyday experience. In his efforts to avoid mechanism, in which the only thing that happens is that the implicit becomes explicit, he verges on positivism, in which the new is so different from the old that we cannot look for the cause of the new in the old. According to his principle of duration the new and the old are strung along somehow together, the present trailing the

past with it, so that he has what has been called "a strung-along universe", which is proceeding without plan or purpose, for to introduce purpose or finalism is but a backward look of the intellect at the already made. The intellect thereby spatializes duration and limits the present by the past or by the future. The way must be kept open for ceaseless change, but this becomes caprice.

Knowledge demands a fixed fulcrum to deal with changing reality. If the knower and the object are changing at the same rate and in the same manner, they are relatively static. It is as two persons on different trains moving at the same speed in the same direction, so that relatively they are not moving at all and their knowledge is of the static and not of the moving and changing. If the two trains are running at different speeds, we have the problem all over again, "How can we know the changing"? As we have seen, Bergson's theory of knowledge, based on change, tends to destroy the self in matter or to swallow it up in spirit, and thus makes knowledge impossible. The intellect that reduces all to the static and inert can not give us knowledge of the changing, yet the thought of change must have as fixed a content as the thought of the changeless, or knowledge is impossible. A changing thought or idea continually runs away before giving us its meaning, and consciousness of change is not possible to a consciousness that is itself all change or a stream. Yet the fact of change must be recognized and we can know it as change only by that which is permanent. The facts of experience and knowledge demand both change and identity for their satisfaction. On the impersonal plane, if we admit change, all becomes change, complete heterogeneity, flow. If, on the impersonal plane, we admit identity, all becomes rigid, fixed, dead. There can be no life or progress. At best

there would be but monotonous repetition of the past. Change we must have and identity we must have. Life and knowledge demand both, but each tends to destroy the other.

There is no way of breaking this deadlock or solving this puzzle except, as Bowne shows, we rise to the personal plane. It is personality alone that can deal with this antinomy. Only in personality can we have some abiding and identical principle superior to change and constant in change, and here it does not consist in any rigid core of being but rather in the extraordinary power of self-consciousness by which the being detaches itself from its states and constitutes itself their identical and abiding ground. Where this is lacking there may be continuity of process, but nothing more. The unchangeability is purely formal as when a given note is constantly produced and this formal unchangeability is possible only through the unchanging self. This is possible and intelligible only on the personal plane. In active intelligence we have that self-equality throughout the changing experience which gives us the permanence, the identity, demanded to know the changing as changing. Thought must reach the changeless or perish. But, on the impersonal plane and under the law of the sufficient reason, thought can never reach the changeless but abides in the eternal flow and infinite regress. This law compels us to find the consequent in the antecedent. If change here, then change there. If plurality here, then plurality there. The problem can never be solved on the mechanical plane, but only on the plane of free personality. The changelessness we need is not the rigidity of a logical category, but the self-identity and self-equality of intelligence. Successive existence is not identity, and changeless existence cannot be found. Identity is given as the self-equality of

intelligence throughout experience and any other conception destroys itself. Both change and changelessness in the concrete have to be interpreted with reference to self-consciousness. Abstract definitions and temporal coordinates only distort the problem and make it fictitious. The change and identity that sufficient reason demands is found in the self as unitary, active, and abiding and not the self as a rolling, accumulating snowball.

What is true of all agents or persons is true of God or the World Ground. God as a rigid sameness of existence would contain no explanation of the advancing, cosmic movement and would admit of no change in action and knowledge. His changelessness of being consists, not in ontological rigidity, but rather in the constancy and continuity of the law which rules His purpose. The unchangeability of God means only the constancy and continuity of the divine nature which exists through all the divine acts as their law and source. Such a personal God, rather than a God who is a continuity of shooting out without plan or purpose, accounts for change and novelty and new beginnings and development, and remains superior to change and constant in change. The change and identity, demanded in God, are found in the extraordinary power of his personality. Any God less than this destroys Himself, destroys reality.

This problem of change and identity like the other problems we consider finds its solution only in terms of personality. The active intelligence is the explanation. In this intelligence cannot be explained but it explains all. It is fundamental and the categories here again must be understood in terms of the experience of intelligence. There is change and there is identity. Either alone destroys life and thought. All can be saved only by personality.

IV. The Self

According to Bergson the self is pure duration. Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. (T.F.W. p.100). It is pure heterogeneity. It is a succession of interpenetrating states of consciousness, a succession of states of consciousness melting into one another like the notes of a melody. Within myself a process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on, which constitutes true duration. Within our ego there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego there is mutual externality without succession, conscious life presents itself under a double aspect, according as it is perceived directly or by refraction through space. Our ego comes in contact with the external world at its surface, and our superficial psychical life comes to be pictured as set out in a homogeneous medium, space, but when we consider the inner self which feels, deliberates, decides, we see that its states cannot be separated in space without undergoing a deep alteration.

But the two selves form one person, and duration therefore seems to be the same for both. Experience ought to teach us to distinguish between duration as quality, such as consciousness immediately apprehends it, and materialized time which has been made quantitative by development in space. We should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two very different ways of regarding duration, two aspects of the conscious life. Below homogenous duration, which is the extensive symbol of true duration, a close psychological analysis istinguishes a duration whose heterogenous moments permeate one another;

below the numerical multiplicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the self with well defined states, a self in which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming an organic whole. (T. F. W. p. 128). But the latter, the fundamental self, is often lost sight of in ordinary practical life. Our external social life has more practical importance for us than our inner and individual existence.

He begins "Creative Evolution" with a striking contrast between what we mean by our own existence and the existence of inert matter. "Sensations, feeling, volitions, ideas - such are the changes into which my existence is divided and which color it in turns. I change then without ceasing". Each of these sensations, etc. is itself undergoing change every moment; if it did not, duration would cease to flow. "My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates". We notice the change only at intervals, but "the state itself is nothing but change", and the transition from one state to another is continuous. Our attention separates these states artificially, and, in order to reunite them, it has to imagine " a formless ego, indifferent and unchangeable, on which it threads the psychic states which it has set up as independent entities". But this colorless and impassive ego is a mere symbol without any reality; its only use is to remind us that the discontinuity we have introduced into our psychic states is an artificial discontinuity of our own making, for what we have done is to eliminate real time. And time is just the stuff our psychical life is made of. There is no stuff more resistant nor more substantial than real time.

From this it will be seen that Bergson's idea of the self is that it is a succession of interpenetrating states of consciousness, in

brief, states of consciousness is the self. Anything like an abiding ego is ruled out as a mere symbol without reality. As he conceives it, states of consciousness in succession, in a stream, are sufficient to explain the self and its experience. How entirely different this is from Bowne's position! He holds that the self is unitary, abiding, active intelligence or ego or person, that has, or is the ground of, states of consciousness. States of consciousness are one thing and consciousness of states is a very different thing. How there can be states of consciousness or consciousness of states apart from a conscious ego or abiding, active self is to Bowne inconceivable. It is the unitary, active, abiding self that produces and knows states of consciousness, by its inner activity. States that are states of no person is contrary to all experience. To speak of states of consciousness or consciousness in general as Bergson does apart from any abiding active person is for Bowne an impossibility, an unknowable. For him, conscious states imply a conscious self as their abiding ground. Although Bergson rules out the idea of an ego, he does just what every other person, who breaks up the self into states or sensations, does; he brings in the self, or me, in some other form, as Green has so fully shown in his "Introduction to Hume". Bergson says: "As our attention has artificially distinguished and separated these states it is by an artificial bond that it is obliged subsequently to reunite them. Consequently, it imagines a self or me, amorphous and unchanging, on which the psychological states that it has converted into independent entities may be threaded and moved like the different pearls of a necklace". "In truth this substratum is not a reality. It is for our consciousness merely a sign intended to remind it perpetually of the artificial character by which attention

sets one state side by side with another where really there is continuity unfolding itself". Bergson, it will be noted, in this quotation as well as throughout the rest of his system, refers to what "our attention" and the "me" and the "our" and "myself" do, but yet the ego or self which is implied and stated in these terms is declared to be a fiction and has no existence. (C. E. 3). What he puts out at the door returns by the window and he is helpless to prevent it, for states apart from a "me " are unmanageable and meaningless. Bergson has attempted to substitute the "not me" for the "me", which is to attempt to reverse the order of life and experience. The "not me" implies the "me" and brings the "me" with it in spite of his refusing to admit it.

Even granting his idea that interpenetrating, successive, states of consciousness constitutes the self, then all becomes flow, change. The self is born and passes away every instant. There is no self that abides. How the past is dragged along in memory, - in fact, how memory itself is possible, is inexplicable. If this change and memory are continually going on and we know it, are conscious of it, it is we who find the change that is continually going on there in our deepest selves into which he bids us descend. It is we who abide and remember. If I find change continually going on in my deepest self or elsewhere then I must be there all the time. If I were not there I could not find it, and I find it all the time then I must be there all the time, and the I that finds it there all the time must be the same I. Unless the same identical I were there, it could not be conscious that change was continually going on and remember that it had been doing so. There could be no consciousness of change unless there were some thing to contrast with it. And what we contrast with it is precisely our

own identity. Even the changes that go on within us would not be changes for us unless we had something to measure them by, and it is precisely by reference to our personal identity that we do measure them. It is only by reference to something unchanging that we can be conscious of change. (Jevons, "Personality" 104). As we have seen in the chapter on "Change and Identity" this whole problem of change can be solved only on the plane of unitary, active, abiding personality. Here and here alone can this antinomy be reconciled. Apart from such a self, if we have change everything becomes flux; or if we have identity everything becomes rigid, fixed, unchangeable. Bergson tells us that these interpenetrating states are inseparable. He emphasizes their continuity and this continuity is the thread on which he strings them as pearls. But what such continuity is apart from an abiding self is inconceivable. This abstraction, continuity, is his substitute for the abiding ego which he ruled out as a fiction, but which we have brought in to bind together these states which we have artificially separated. But this abstraction, continuity or permeation is not strong enough to hold these states together and save the unity of the self. We have succeeded in separating them so completely that we have built up another self. We are then two selves, the deep true self of duration, spirit, and the superficial, false self of space, matter, and intellect, and it is in the latter that we live most of the time and in which the practical work and associations of life take place, yet these two selves are somehow one. It is in the self of duration that we find our freedom. Here Bergson's dualism again manifests itself. These two selves he never is able to reconcile. One is of the ascending current and the other of the descending current and these two are in conflict. The ascending current tends

toward pure spirit and freedom, the descending toward pure space. Between these limits there are an indefinite number of degrees of spirit and freedom, and degree is a self. Why not then an indefinite number of selves instead of only two? Thus in another way we have reached the same conclusion as above where all is change and any state of consciousness might, while it lasted, be the self and thus there would be an indefinite number of selves which is saying that we are legion and in reality nobody in particular, for there is no abiding self to know and speak. The self has become a flux, a stream.

Again he refers to the self as a snowball rolling upon the snow, accumulating and increasing and changing as it rolls, so that all its past is rolled up with the present. Thus the self, as continuous states of consciousness, progresses, accumulates, changes and all the past is continually present, so that all that we have ever felt or thought or been, yea even the prenatal facts of our lives, are continually present with us seeking to break into the present, are only restrained by the cerebral system. The mass of all the conscious states of our whole life bound together by interpenetration and continuity constitute our present self and experience. We are masses of conscious states, superficial, spatial, intellectual states and deep temporal spiritual states all bound together by <u>continuity</u>, as the snowball rolled upon the snow. There is no more unity about such a self than there is about the snowball. It is but a mechanical unity in which individuality is lost. In fact the only individuality which Bergson knows or can admit is not in the spiritual nature but in the bodily organism. Individuality is not for Bergson as for Bowne a spiritual matter. "On flows the vital current, running through human generations, subdividing itself into individuals. This subdivision was vaguely indi-

cated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created which nevertheless in a certain sense preexisted. They are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity". (C. E. 269). "We ourselves are a compromise between the spiritual movement and the material movement. Supra-consciousness has organized us by insinuating itself into matter, the object of this organization being to triumph over necessity. Consciousness is mobility itself, but our own consciousness is compelled to drag a body and to share its vicissitudes. The union gives rise to individuality, and our feeling of self, or personality, comes from the fact that our consciousness of the movements of our own body differs from our consciousness of the movements of other bodies". (Kitchin 236). So that according to Bergson our individuality or self-hood is determined by our bodies rather than by our spirits. It is a bodily thing rather than a spiritual as Bowne holds. If it is a matter of the body when the body perishes personal identity is destroyed.

Not only does the self not have a distinct individuality even in connection with matter, but by the weight of its past and by the vital current which throws it off as a little rill, it is pre-determined. Its freedom is simply in doing the thing that the driving power of its past and of the current forces it to do. We may talk of freedom here as Bergson does, but how under these conditions there can be any spontaneity or choice, it is difficult to understand. Bergson admits as much in what he has to say of the superficial, spatial, intellectual self in which we live and move and have our being so much of the time, the practical self. It is a mechanical self. The other self is a

thing of rare, brief experiences when by what of intellect and will we have we plunge into the life current and gain our rare, brief freedom by annhilating ourselves.

Bowne's self, on the other hand, is active intelligence, unitary and abiding, which the Personal Cause of the world freely posits in His own image and sustains and vitalizes every instant. It is free because its personal ground is free. It abides because He abides. It lives and moves and has its being in Him, but yet it has a spiritual individuality of its own. It is not a mass of states bound together by a something called continuity or inter-permeation so that it is strung along, nor the the unity of a snowball, but its unity is in its deepest, abiding, spiritual nature. It may live a superficial, worldly, materialistic life, as so many times it does, thus limiting itself, or it may live a deep, rich, spiritual life, but it is one and the same self. And in passing from the earthy, superficial life to the spiritual life it does not destroy its individuality, yea even itself, but gains and saves it individuality, freedom and self. Its identity is its self-equality throughout experience. It changes and abides. It is the causal ground of its conscious states. Their unity is not found in themselves but in their unitary ground. Unity and continuity apart from an abiding self we have not. This self did not preexist in this personal cause that produced it, created it, as the snowball existed in the snow or the rill in the great stream, so that it is so much being deducted from its cause which is diminished so much thereby and which may be considered as never coming to consciousness except in these rills and organisms. Bergson verges on pantheism. Bowne by personalism saves the personality and individuality of his world ground and provides at the same time for the personality and individuality of human beings. Bergson by refusing to come to personalism cannot so save either his world ground or finite persons.

V. Space and Time

1. Space

In "Time and Free Will", Bergson holds that, as our senses perceive the qualities of bodies and space along with them, we have to decide whether (1) space or extensity is an aspect or quality of these physical qualities, or whether, (2) these qualities are essentially unextended, space coming in as a later addition, but being itself sufficient and coming in without them. The first hypothesis reduces space to an abstraction, rather than an extract, the element belonging to certain sensations in common. This makes space but a mental form of experience. It has no other reality. It is phenomenal. This is Bowne's position. In the second case, space would be a reality as solid as the sensations themselves, though of a different order. This is what Bergson holds. Space or extensity is not an abstraction, "Space is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation and consequently it is a reality with no quality". (T. F. W. 95) He draws a distinction between perception of extensity and the conception of space. Animals may have the former, "but the conception of an empty, homogeneous medium is something far more extraordinary, being a kind of reaction against heterogeneity which is the very ground of experience". The faculty of conceiving a space without quality is not the faculty of abstraction, for that implies the intuition of a homogeneous medium. "What we must say is, that we have to do with two different kinds of reality, the one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous, namely space. This latter, clearly conceived by the

human intellect enables us to use clean cut distinctions, to count, to abstract and perhaps speak". (T. F. W. 97) Throughout his argument, space is conceived as a reality, an empty homogeneous or quality-less medium. Space is a reality in which things move. It is self-sufficient, "existing without qualities of bodies". In this quality-less, homogeneous medium there is of course neither duration nor real succession, but simultaneity, repetition. But an empty homogeneous, medium, devoid of every quality whatsoever, is certainly undistinguishable from nothing. It is zero.

"If space is the homogeneous, then any homogeneous and unbounded medium will be space, for, homogeneity here consisting in the absence of quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the homogeneous could be distinguished from one another. Yet time, an unbounded and homogeneous medium, is usually distinguished from space; so that the homogeneous is supposed to take a double form, according as it is filled with co-existence or succession. But when we make time a homogeneous medium, in which conscious states unfold themselves, we take it to be given all at once and therefore lacking duration. Hence time as a homogeneous medium is a spurious concept; it is time unconsciously spatialized. Nor can we admit two forms of the homogeneous without asking whether one is not reducible to the other, and a priori we can say that the idea of space is the fundamental one. Those philosophers who have maintained the contrary have failed to see that this bastard conception of time is a mere phantom of space haunting the reflective consciousness". (Kitchin, 59) Thus Bergson reduces this time to space, and space, as an empty homogeneous medium, without any quality whatsoever, turns out to be nothing. Consequently this time as an empty, homogeneous medium, without quality, the time in which we make distinctions and in which we count - the time of reflective con-

sciousness as it is postulated in mechanics - also turns out to be nothing. That is, space and time, (abstract time) are nothing as realities. (His idea of concrete time will be considered later) Bergson can do nothing with space and time as anything else than empty, qualityless, homogeneous media or nothings. He has more realities on hand already than he can manage. So that starting with space as reality, it turns out to be nothing and abstract time also turns out to be nothing. But this is going too far, for space and time are not delusions. They have meaning, some kind of reality. Bowne holds that they are mental forms of experience. Their reality is phenomenal, not ontological. But Bowne would not hold them reducible to one another, that is, identical, as Bergson here does. For Bowne, space is one form of mental experience or phenomenal reality and time is another. The former arises from an experience of co-existence of things, the latter from succession and change.

Although Bergson strips space of all its qualities, he yet regards it as reality. This would be something like what Bowne calls pure being and holds non-existent, an empty abstraction. This is what Bergson's real space turns out to be when it is regarded apart from the objects contained in it, that is, apart from experience.

In "Matter and Memory" Bergson defines space thus, "Abstract space is indeed at bottom nothing but the mental diagram of infinite divisibility". (p. 275) "We must throw beneath the continuity of sensible qualities, that is to say, beneath concrete extensity. a net work, of which the meshes may be altered to any shape whatsoever and become as small as we please; this substratum, which is merely conceived, this wholly ideal diagram of arbitrary and infinite divisibility, is homogeneous space". (p. 278) What in "Time and

Free Will" he called solid reality, he now calls a "wholly ideal diagram", and homogeneous time is described as "a diagrammatic design of succession in general". Homogeneous time is no longer regarded as identical with homogeneous space; each retains its specific characteristic as we said Bowne would consider them. His conception of homogeneous space as a "wholly ideal diagram" is getting nearer to Bowne's conception of space as a mental form. His theory of space in "Creative Evolution" is substantially the same as that in "Matter and Memory". Space, as a homogeneous and empty medium, infinite and infinitely divisible, implies a power to carve reality as we like; this space is the plan of our possible action on things. It is a view taken by the mind and it enables the mind to decompose according to any law and to recompose into any system. (p. 156) Personality descends in the direction of space when the interpenetration of conscious states becomes broken up and externalized. The idea which the mind "forms of pure space is only the schema of the limit at which this movement would end. Once in possession of the form of space mind uses it like a net with meshes that can be made and unmade at will, which, thrown over matter, divides it as the needs of our action demand. Thus the space of our geometry and the spatiality of things are mutually engendered by the reciprocal action and reaction of two terms (mind and matter) which are essentially the same, but which move each in the direction "inverse of the other . Neither is space so foreign to our nature as we imagine, nor is matter as completely extended in space as our senses and intellect represent it". (C. E. 202) Space is thus a mental schema resulting from the reciprocal action of matter and mind and once formed the mind uses it at will. Things enable the mind to find space which mind could have found without things if it had sufficient imagination. (p. 202)

This is not far from the position of Bowne who holds space to be a mental form, it is a form of intelligence in experience with objective reality. It has no other reality. The experience of active intelligence is its only explanation. Bergson's real space tends in spite of him to pass into a mental schema.

As Bergson distinguishes between abstract and concrete time, so he would distinguish between abstract or ideal space and concrete space. The former we use for our geometry and the latter we move in. This distinction he cannot sustain. If one is concretely real, the other is also. If one is abstract or ideal, likewise the other. He confuses himself by speaking of "Outside of me" and "Within me". But it is "me" in both cases dealing with the fact of experience, and "Outside me" and "Within me" cannot be thought of in spatial terms, and if the idea of space is introduced it certainly is ideal or abstract space in both cases. We do not need space as real to move in any more than we need real space to dream in. They are both ideal, phenomenal, only mental forms, according to Bowne.

Bergson's idea of space becomes more and more unmanageable for him except as he reduces it to abstract or ideal space, which is practically Bowne's position. When he makes it a homogeneous, qualityless medium, or in other words, nothing, he has gone too far, for space is not a delusion; and when he attempts to make it a concrete reality. he has gone too far in the opposite direction and he has all the difficulties of pluralism on his hands which he cannot manage. Bowne would suggest some very difficult problems. What is the relation between this reality, space, and the other realities in it? If it is real it is infinitely divisible. What binds its parts together and gives it unity? If it is real it needs space to exist in and so on in infinite regress. Are things, as we have divided them by the net

of space, more illusions? This is what Bergson's theory commits him to. Space as reality must be causal, must do something, but what does it do? What is its causal effect on things? If space is real then all reality in space must have bulk as space has, i.e., all becomes spatial. Then even life and spirit must have bulk and like space be infinitely divisible as matter is. What becomes of personal individuality? Is a person one or many? Indeed Bergson, as we have seen, has no other individuality than the organism, a part, in some way, of the whole, a rivulet off the stream of life. Now this rivulet or organism or self like the stream becomes infinitely divisible, goes to pieces. We have infinite pluralism. How are these pluralities bound together into system, if system we have? The only thing or way Bergson offers is the abstraction, continuity. Bergson's system has been difficult for him to manage at best, but with real space it will go to pieces, break up into infinite multiplicity. Little wonder that Bergson's idea of space varies as it does. He wabbles between space as nothing and space as concrete reality, not being able to remain in either idea of it. The only way out of his difficulty is Bowne's way out. Personality saves us. Space is a mental form. It is a phenomenal reality. It is no illusion, it is not a nothing, nor is it concrete reality. It is not unreal but it is real only for mind. It does not therefore become a delusion. Space is still a form of our objective experience and is law giving for that experience as ever. Our knowledge of space is a mental interpretation of the action of things upon the mind. There is no need of real space to explain our experience. The realistic view of space is inconsistent and, upon analysis, even unintelligible. It hovers between making space something and nothing and both views are

absurd. It also conflicts with the unity of being and forces us to regard the infinite as composed of parts. For if space is real, God as real must be in space and consequently must have bulk and be infinitely divisible even as real space is. Spiritual reality as in space would be as divisible as space. The realistic view of space involves us in a hopeless dualism of first principles in that it implies two necessary mutually independent principles, which is strictly impossible. The objective existence of space cannot be proven and the idea of such space is unclear, inconsistent, impossible. Bowne rejects it therefore, for the view that space is ultimately a mental form or principle of intuition, that is, a category. Space in the second place is a mode of appearance, but though it is subjective it is not arbitrary or individual. Space then is phenomenal. It is not a boundless void in which things exist, but only the general form of objective experience. (Bowne-Metaphysics,153-154) Toward this view Bergson is more and more compelled by his system and the demands of experience. It is the only tenable position.

II. Time

Bergson divides time into the abstract and concrete. Abstract or ideal time is the time of intellect, of geometry or science. It is a bastard time due to the intellect's spatializing duration or concrete time. Hence like space it is a homogeneous, qualityless medium and finally identified with space. And as empty, homogeneous, qualityless, space is in fact nothing, ideal and abstract time is likewise nothing. But as we have seen Bergson tries to rescue such space from nothingness for space cannot be made a nothing, a delusion. And he also differentiates between abstract space and abstract time. Time cannot be made a nothing and a delusion any more than space can. As we have

seen his idea of space becomes workable only as it approaches more and more the idea of Bowne that space is a mental form, a form of active intelligence in experience and apart from the experience of active intelligence it is nothing. It is not a delusion but phenomenal reality, real only in and for intelligence.

What becomes of time in Bergson's system? Like space it refuses to be relegated to the realm of nothingness. Bergson tells us that concrete time as duration is real, the most real, substantial and resistant stuff we know. It is the very stuff of the psychical life. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances. Thus our personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new added to what was before. Our life is true duration or concrete time. Duration is active, it does something otherwise it would be nothing. It is creative.

But we have already pointed out in discussing reality that, as Bergson progresses from "Time and Free Will" into "Creative Evolution", duration or concrete time is conceived of more and more as a force of another quality or kind. Its temporal quality is less and less prominent as the very stuff of reality, the creative power, the most resistant thing we know. There comes forward, as the creative power, vital impetus, the elan vital, the rushing, pushing, changing, producing, creating, life current. When we come to his third chapter of "Creative Evolution" and see and feel this elan at work it seems about to sweep us off our feet. Until we recover ourselves and our reason, we are inclined to exclaim, "It is done! It is sufficient!" But what has become of duration as time? We find it figuring as a form conditioning the creative efficiency of the elan. It is the form under which the elan works, very much as, for Bowne, time is the form

of our inner or mental experience. Duration more and more takes on the nature of his abstract or ideal time. If duration and vital impulse are now used synonomously by him, as they often are, it is with the character of vital impulse. Otherwise duration has but its temporal meaning as a conditioning form, it is as ideal time, and what we have already said of this ideal time applies here. Consciously or unconsciously Bergson has found the problem and work of creation too great for real time or duration; and, as he sought to make it sufficient by constant enrichment, it changed its form and nature until it was no longer what he began with except in name, and he then calls it, according to its new nature, elan vital; and duration remains as ideal time, a form of the working of this elan. Thus he is approaching the view of Bowne that time is but a mental form of experience and has no reality or existence apart from the experience of active intelligence. It has reality only in and for intelligence. It is no delusion. It is phenomenally real.

And the end is not yet. As Bergson has been compelled to enrich his creative power more and more until it has attained its present status and nature, and still, as we have already seen, it will not be sufficient to explain life and thought until it is raised to the plane of personality, for nothing less can satisfy the demands of sufficient reason. To make vital impetus or cosmic elan sufficient, means to raise it to the personal plane, making it active intelligence under another name. Bergson's real time becomes ideal time the more the elan is enriched to meet the demands. The nearer the elan approaches active intelligence the more sufficient it becomes but also the more time becomes a form of mental experience. If we are correct in our treatment of Bergson's theory of time and the elan this is what is taking place in his system which he and his followers say is still in

the making. It is becoming. As it becomes and changes more and more it will, we firmly believe, more and more approach Bowne's position. Then will time become the form of the elan's mental activity. This is the more evident as we consider Bowne's theory of time as he sums it up:

1 - Time is primarily an order of relations in our experience. This order admits of no question or denial. (Time is no delusion.)

2 - There is no ontological time separate from things and events, in which they exist or occur.

3 - There is no order of ontological change of which time is the form and to which time may be referred, without reference to intelligence.

4 - Both time and change must be referred to intelligence as their source.

5 - Neither time nor change can be carried into intelligence as such without making thought impossible. (As we have shown there must be a permanent, abiding, unitary self to make knowledge possible. Otherwise all is a disorganized flux.)

6 - Neither time nor change can be construed with reference to an extra-mental fact, but only from the stand-point of self-conscious intelligence.

7 - Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative to the range and contents of self-consciousness.

8 - Non-temporality is not to be conceived as a temporal co-existence, as if one should say that the earth is on all sides of the sun at the same time, but rather as the immediate possession of the objects by the conscious mind. This relation cannot be construed in temporal terms but must be experienced.

9 - What this may mean may be gathered from reflection on what we call present experience. This is not temporal in the sense of having a real before and after in it. It is temporal in the sense of having the temporal form. It is non-temporal in the sense that the conscious self grasps all its elements in an indivisible act and thus makes consciousness possible.

10 - But still experience has the temporal form; and we may resume our temporal language with all confidence, only guarding ourselves against mistaking this form for an ontological fact, and also against overlooking the relativity in the temporal judgment due to our limitation. (Metaphysics, 193)

This is the only tenable position. It gives us all the time we need and the only time we can use. As persons we do not demand any other time. This theory of time saves us from the problems and difficulties of pluralism and mechanism. It makes possible a defensible view of the One and the Many. Bergson seems to be approaching this position. Time and space more and more tend to become phenomenal, mental forms, in his system. He can manage them only as they become such. Bowne's prophecy that Bergson would yet reach the personal plane seems well grounded.

VI. Freedom and Necessity

Bergson says we must think of freedom in terms of time, duration, not of space, as we are so accustomed to do because we are under the domination of the reflecting (backlooking), spatializing, materializing intellect. Because of this domination by the intellect intension becomes extension; quality becomes quantity; succession becomes simultaneity; or, in short, time becomes space. Spirit is materialized and we are in the toils of radical mechanism or radical finalism, which means determination or necessity. The spatialized self is not free. To the extent that self is spatialized, it is necessitated. We are not free when we think, but when we live. The self of the intellect, under the domination of which we are nearly all of the time, is not free. This is the material self. It is the spiritual self, the self of duration, intuition, that is free. So we are free only at those rare, brief moments, when, by heroic act of intellect and will and a twist or wrench of the self, we plunge into the life current and, relaxed and reflecting not, are swept along in it and by it. "But rare indeed are the moments when we are self possessed to this extent: it is then that our actions are truly free". (C. D. 200) We are free when we live, change and become with the vital impulse which, sweeping us along, sweeps over us and through us. The self "lives and develops by means of its very hesitations, until the free action drops from it like an over ripe fruit". (T. F. W. 176) An act is free, not because of its spontaneity, but because it is a unique new creation, the culmination of a personal history, which never repeats itself. It springs from the fundamental self and freedom becomes incredible as soon as the conscious states are separated or spatialized, for then

they cease to endure, consequently cease to create, hence are not free. It is the uniqueness of the psychic state from which the act springs that makes it free. "It agrees with the whole of our most intimate feelings, thought and aspirations, with that particular conception of life which is the equivalent of all our past experience, in a word with our whole personal idea of happiness and of honor", i.e., it drops as over ripe fruit from our whole life. If we say it is an effect, it is unforeseeable; if it is caused, it cannot be known as caused. Bergson does not appear to recognize that an act may be unforeseeable and yet be the result of causes.

His figure of the over ripe fruit is his favorite way of expressing his idea of freedom. Throughout his system, his conception of freedom is well expressed by this figure of fruit over ripe dropping of its own accord. Such an idea of freedom is very different from that usually held. If our freedom is like that of a fruit tree, it cannot be of much account for those problems of pure ethics which concern Kant and Bowne. "The categorical imperative cannot find here a resting place if the free act is like a vegetable growth". It is something that takes place in us and for us rather than anything which we, of our own spontaneity, will power, choice and effort bring to pass. We gain our freedom by submitting to the vital force, losing ourselves in the vital current and allowing it to have its way with us. What then happens in our lives drops as over ripe fruit, not by anything that we have done or been to cause it, but because we lost ourselves in the cosmic elan. This idea of freedom differs radically from that of Bowne, who holds "freedom in our human life to mean the power of self direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for the realization". (Metaphysics, 405) Bowne's idea

of freedom enables him to deal successfully with the problem of error in thinking and the problem of moral responsibility. Bergson's idea of freedom destroys the self in the cosmic elan. The spatializing intellect and what of will we have is used to commit oneself to the life current and thus achieve freedom by losing self. But how, what then happens for us and through us, can be called free and true and right so far as anything that we do, is something Bergson does not stop to explain, nor can a follower of Bowne see how it can be called free and true and right, for, individual initiative, self determination, self direction, so far as we had them, have been taken from us. There is no longer independent activity, no ability to weigh, reconsider, decide, etc. Whatever happens drops from our lives like over-ripe fruit. As the life current courses through the apple tree until the fruit drops over-ripe from its branches, without any will or choice or effort on the part of the tree, so it happens in our lives. The fact that we think that it is otherwise with us is due to our reflective intellects which look back on the already done and, spatializing all, puts the self at the parting of the ways where we seem to hesitate, plan, weigh, reconsider, debate, decide and choose. But this is not what happens. Instead there is unceasing movement, becoming, progress, i. e., duration. This, as Bowne views it, is not freedom but necessity, for if in this movement, becoming, progress, there is not individual initiative, plan, choice, purpose, there is necessity and not freedom.

The element of fixity in our nature through our relation to the world ground, as Bowne conceives it, we have already discussed. Freedom is not lawlessness, caprice. The self is not a capricious jumble. But it has an orderly nature. It is a being of system and law and it finds its freedom by acting in accordance therewith, as the railway train finds its freedom on the track which directs it. Act we must,

and according to certain fundamental principles of our being or according to our nature. But it is for us to initiate that action, choose its direction, give it purpose, weigh our action, consider and reconsider it, make mistakes and do wrong, think correctly and incorrectly. In these possibilities our freedom consists. The results from such action are the fruits of our freedom, produced by effort, and not dropping, over ripe, from our lives.

Bergson says this vital impulse or life current is limited, not by its own choice or determination, but from without. There are things it would do, but is not able. It is "a limited force which is always seeking to transcend itself and always remains inadequate to the work which it would fain produce". "It cannot create absolutely because it is confronted with matter, that is to say, with the movement that is the inverse of its own." Matter which is necessity itself limits it. (C. E. 126, 251, 254) Bergson expresses the limitation of the freedom of the vital impulse in the following fine passage: "From our point of view life appears in its entirety as an immense wave which, starting from a centre, spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of its circumference is stopped and converted into oscillation: at one single point the obstacle has been forced, the impulsion has passed freely. It is this freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, continues the vital movement indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that life carries in itself. On other lines of evolution there have traveled other tendencies which life implied, and of which, since everything interpenetrates, a man has, doubtless, kept something, but of which he has kept only very little. It is as if a vague and formless being, who

we may call, as we will, man or superman, had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a part of himself on the way." (C. E. 266) This vital impulse finds what freedom it has in man and this freedom as we have seen is at the expense of man's freedom.

But this vital current, he tells us, has somehow been interrupted and turned upon itself and against itself, so that there is now an ascending current towards spirit and a descending current of matter toward pure space. These two currents are in conflict. The ascending current is struggling with matter to insinuate into it as much indetermination as possible. In this process human beings are formed. What of success the vital impulse has had in dealing with this current of matter, it has in human beings and by giv i ng them organisms and a certainly bodily individuality. In all other directions or efforts in dealing with this material current, it has been hindered, thwarted more or less, and, even in man, it has only partially succeeded in coming to freedom. This material current is able to limit and hinder and determine more or less the spiritual current. Hence, this spiritual current is finite, for no infinite power could be hindered or limited by a finite power. This limitation of the spiritual current is from without and contrary to its will and desire and do its best, it cannot overcome it as it fain would do. This limitation is in direct opposition to its course and desire. This means that it is necessitated, it is not free and cannot produce a free system or give freedom to its beings or creatures. So that man being the product of this finite, necessitated, spiritual current, struggling with the material current must be necessitated. For man to have freedom according to Bowne's idea of freedom is an impossibility in Bergson's system, for it is a system of necessity According to Bowne, freedom in the system demands an infinite, unlimited

free world-ground. We reach the same conclusion when we consider this cosmic elan in the light of the power of force that interrupted it and turned it upon itself and against itself. Had the cosmic elan been infinite it could not have been thus interrupted, and turned against itself. Why should it have been interrupted? Whatever this interrupting power or force, whether finite or infinite, the cosmic elan is finite and determined and necessitated by this interruping agent from which it has never been able to free itself. It is unable to turn back the material current toward pure spirit, except in a limited degree in man. Viewed from this stand-point his system turns out to be one of necessity, hence freedom, as Bowne understands it, we cannot have.

The bearing of this problem of freedom and necessity upon thought is of vast importance. In a system of necessity we cannot raise the question of truth and error. Whatever is, is, and that is all that can be said of it. One thing is just as true as another so long as it lasts. There is no possibility of false propositions and conclusions that are not true. What we call error is just as necessary as what we call truth. Things simply run off, are produced, become, result, drop as over-ripe fruit, and that is all there is of it. That we think, weigh and debate, reconsider and correct, is a delusion and the delusion is just as necessary as anything else. The principles of logic are null and void. There is no clarifying our thought. That we think is a mistake, the impulse thinks in us, if think it can be called. Truth and falsehood are one and the same and they drop from us like over-ripe fruit.

The bearing of this problem of freedom and necessity upon responsibility and morality is also vastly important. The distinction be-

tween right and wrong, like that between truth and error, vanishes. We cannot raise the question of the rightness or wrongness of anything. If we do raise it, it is because we are predestined to do so. Whatever is, is, and there is no right or wrong about it. Our sense of responsibility is a delusion and this delusion like everything else is a necessity. Bergson has been challenged to write his system of ethics. Thus far he has not accepted the challenge, nor can he, unless he gives us a system in which all moral distinctions are obliterated and no question of responsibility or of right or wrong is raised. He speaks of motives but how, in such a system in which finalism is ruled out and the whole is so dominated by necessity, can motives be possible or have any meaning?

VII. G O D

In a personal letter Bergson denies that his system is an atheist monism. He rejects the doctrines which confine themselves to personifying the unity of nature or the unity of knowledge into God as motionless first cause. God would really be nothing since he could no nothing. He says, "The considerations put forth in my "Essay on the Immediate Data" result in an illustration of the fact of liberty; those of "Matter and Memory" lead us, I hope, to put our finger on mental reality; those of"Creative Evolution" present creation as a fact: from all this we derive a clear idea of a free and creating God producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort is continued in a vital direction, by the evolution of species and the construction of human personalities". (LeRoy p. 224)

In considering the nature of creation by the vital impulse with its ascending and descending currents he says: "Things and states are only views taken by our mind of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions. I find that the automatic and strictly determined evolution of this well knit whole is action which is unmaking itself, and the the unforeseen forms which life cuts out in it, forms capable of being themselves prolonged into unforeseen movements, represent the action that is making itself. Now, I have every reason to believe that the other worlds are analagous to ours, not all constructed at the same time, since observation shows me, even today, nebulae in course of concentration. Now, if the same kind of action is going on everywhere, whether it is that which is unmaking itself or whether it is that which is striving to remake itself, I

simply express this probable similitude when I speak of a center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fireworks display - provided however that I do not present this center as a thing, but as a continuity of shooting out. God, thus defined, has nothing of the ready made; He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation so conceived, is not a mystery; we experience it in ourselves when we act freely. In reality, life is a movement, materiality is the inverse movement, and each of these two movements is simple, the matter which forms a world being an undivided flux, and undivided also the life that runs through it, cutting out in it living beings all along its track". (C. E. 248-249)

This, in brief, is his idea of God and creation as stated in his greatest product, chapter three of "Creative Evolution". God is a continuity of shooting out. He is unceasing life, action, freedom. He is pure creative activity, not a fountain but a flowing, not a center from which things emanate but a continuity of emanation. He is duration, vital impulse, cosmic elan, immanent and continuous. He is consciousness in general. He is creative evolution. He has nothing of the already made. He is becoming, changing, evolving. God is not yet fully realized but is developing and growing. He is the flowing in which all things flow. He is the current that has been interrupted and turned upon Himself and against Himself and now is in mighty conflict with Himself. He is, without plan or purpose, rushing and pushing on, driving like Jehu, furiously, He knows not where or why. He is limited and finite, necessitated by the force or agency that interrupted Him. This interrupter must be the force or agency that interrupted Him. This interrupter must be the adversary Satan and, in the descending current of God, the flowing, we find that he has created conflict and strife within the domain of the flowing God. God

is helpless and fain would overcome this opposition and conflict, but is not able.

Such, it seems, are the conclusions at which we must arrive as to the Nature of God and His kingdom, according to Bergson's system. This is certainly a condition of heterogeneity. It is a becoming in which God Himself does not know what is going to happen or what He is going to become or what is going to become of Himself. A bit of finalism, even though it savored of mechanism, would be welcome if it would give us some certainty. All is unforeseeable indeed and irreversible. It is a phantasmagoric flux. To talk of freedom in such a God demands that we redefine the word to suit the conditions. New departures are abundant, but not even God knows what they may be. Miracles, as already said, should be commonplace, everyday, occurrences. Optimism must become a diminishing quantity, a descending current whose limit is zero.

Bergson is not an atheist, for he believes in a God and has given us his idea of that God. However the use of the name, God, is one thing, and the idea or nature of that God is quite another thing. So, when Bergson tells us that he believes in God and then goes on to describe and define that God in terms of duration and vital impetus or cosmic elan, continuity of shooting out, we discover that while he is a theist, in the sense of having a God, his God is very different from the personal God of Bowne, the God who is our Father, immanent yet transcendent, working according to the plan of the whole. Nor can Bergson be called a monist, for his God has become many. He is a pluralist and at best his God is first among many. God is finite and limited. God is in and of the universe as much as the universe is in and of God. The cosmic elan is not transcendent, but is immanent. Bergson would be more properly classed as a pantheist than as a monotheist, but it

is difficult to classify him at all, for he and his system like his God and because of his God are in a state of becoming and we know not yet what he shall be, nor what his God shall be. All is in flux. Nothing has been realized. God and all are yet becoming, evolving, flowing, changing.

So far, however, we must say that his God is impersonal. It may become personal. Bowne would call Bergson's God infra-personal, but Bergson would say it is supra-personal. Bowne's highest ideal for Bergson's God is that it may become personal. Bergson's highest ideal for his own God would seem to be that it may become able to make all supra-personal. Personality, as Bowne uses it, means self-consciousness and self-direction, and Bowne's God possesses these qualities in the highest degree, and human beings are personal because, in varying degrees, they also possess these qualities. They have been created by God in His own image. But according to Bergson, personality is a characteristic of human beings in their bodily condition. He refers to the elan as consciousness in general, but to Bowne, consciousness in general is a pure abstraction and in meaningless. The elan reaches self-consciousness only in man, its point of greatest freedom and success. Self-direction, this limited elan has only in a degree nor could it do more without involving itself in finalism, which is mechanical and necessitated. All that can be said of it is that it is doing the best it can under the limitations that have been imposed upon it not of itself. It is working, acting, becoming without any definite plan or goal. Only in one instance has it scored a decisive triumph, that is in man, who, so far, is the crowning achievement of the evolutionary process. "But man must not be regarded teleologically as an end, for we cannot say that the evolution of man, as he is, was

intended when the process began (for this would imply finalism), and the accidents incidental to the course of evolution might have made him very different, even morally, from what he is. At the same time, he is an end, in that he is the main terminal point which evolution has reached and a distinct advance upon, and different in kind from, its other products". (Kitchin) For definite purpose to arise any where in the process is for all to become to that extent necessitated, according to Bergson who holds that no fixed end can modify or determine the process. In a vague way he admits the possibility and necessity of a degree of finalism, but he fears to let the camel get his nose into the tent lest he come in and drive his master out, as he surely would in this case. He has no personal God over-ruling and directing all, but his God is in the changing, flowing process with all things. His God is becoming, so God Himself knows not what He shall be. What man shall become we know not, for evolution is not complete. What the end is for both God and man, not even God himself can tell, for all is in a process of becoming. Bergson seems unable to conceive of God in any other way than such a flow or becoming without making Him an absolute that determines all according to an iron principle of necessity and in attempting to escape necessity and determination in this form, he has fallen into necessity in even a worse form.

Bowne's idea of God as the personal cause of all things culminates in the conception of God as Father. He is personal, almighty to create, almighty to sustain and renew. He is in all and over all, God the Father blessed forever. He works all things according to His will and purpose and with a loving regard for all his creatures. That all is complete and exactly as God would have it, that the end has been reached and nothing more can be done or is doing, this does not imply.

The plan of the whole like the separate products is His and subject to His control. New departures are possible. Growth and progress are by Him. Changelessness in Him does not mean rigid fixity that brings all to a standstill, reduces all to mechanism. His changelessness means the constancy and continuity of His divine nature which exists through all the divine acts as their law and source. The change and permanence of God can be understood only in terms of personality. It is His personal nature. He is not lawless, capricious, uncertain. He has system and order which make life and growth and progress possible, safe and dependable. He is not a limited, helpless part of His system. He works freely in His universe which is subject to His free control. He works and we His sons work with Him. We, with our personality, may even oppose Him, for we, too, have self-direction and self-consciousness. But this is not because God is unable, for lack of power, to prevent our doing so, but out of respect for His own work in our personality, which is subject to His control: out of His respect for us, His sons whom He is leading into filial relation with Himself. Optimism can here save itself and hope need not perish from the earth, for though we may not be able to understand all things that we see taking place, we feel sure that back of all and in all and over all is a God, who is not merely a continuity of shooting out, a capricious flux, a becoming that has not found itself, but a righteous and all wise God, who doeth all things well and according to a great plan of the whole, in which He is able to make all things work together for good. Bowne does not, as Bergson, judge after the sight of his eyes or the hearing of his ears. Whatever may be the arguments for optimism and for pessimism in dealing with the problems of evil, to Bowne the supreme and unanswerable argument for optimism is the incarnation.

While he used the other arguments, this one of the incarnation meets the deepest needs of life and makes possible a cheerful, faithful, courageous, hopeful, righteous life. Such was his idea of the personal World Ground as God and Father that he believed in, a spirit of Love and Goodness at the heart of the universe.

"Back of the loaf is the snowy flour,
Back of the flour is the mill,
Back of the mill is the wheat and the shower
And the sun and the Father's will."

Bowne's God is a knowable God. He can not be demonstrated but yet He makes Himself known. His spirit is all around us and within us. "Nearer is He than breathing, nearer than hands and feet". With Him we may hold fellowship. We do not plunge out of ourselves and lose ourselves in Him to know Him. But as person knows person, and friend knows friend, and spirit blends with spirit, so man as person may know God as person. This knowledge is not by some special faculty but by the whole personality. In this no faculty of the person is depreciated as being earthy in nature and purpose and unfit for this richer knowledge, but all, the whole personality, is brought to this knowledge. Bowne does not believe in two or more selves in us but believes that each of us is a unitary, abiding , personal self created in the image of God and for Him, whom we may know and in whom we find fullness of life and knowledge.

"O Love that will not let me go,
I rest my weary soul in Thee;
I give Thee back the life I owe,
That in Thine ocean depths its flow
May richer, fuller be".

"O Light that followest all my way,
I yield my flickering torch to Thee;
My heart restores its borrowed ray,
That in the sunshine's blaze its day
May brighter, fairer, be".

This he believed, lived and taught. His was a true mysticism that saved and quickened the self. There is not much in Bergson's idea of God to inspire enthusiasm and beget hope. There is nothing to indicate that the pushing, contending force or forces that constitute his God care any more for their creatures, including human beings, than the ocean cares for the branches floating on it or the ships that sail over it. Bowne's God, who is a Father, cares for human beings as His children, loves, helps, forgives and keeps them. We are told that Bergson has not yet expressed himself on the theology of his system, so that we do not know what he may say. However that may be, what his system will permit him to say on this subject as well as on ethics is quite well forecast by the fundamentals of that system.

VIII. Immortality

Bergson says, "All our analyses show us, in life, an effort to remount the incline that matter descends. The life that evolves on the surface of our planet is indeed attached to matter. If it were pure consciousness, a fortiori, if it were supra-consciousness, it would be pure creative activity. In fact, it is riveted to an organism that subjects it to the general laws of inert matter. But everything happens as if it were doing its utmost to set itself free from these laws. It has not the power to reverse the direction of physical changes. It does, however, behave absolutely as a force would behave, which, left to itself, would work in the inverse direction. Incapable of stopping the course of material changes downward it succeeds in retarding it". (C. E. 245) "In the organized world, the death of individuals does not seem at all like a diminution of life in general or like a necessity which life submits to reluctantly. Life has never made an effort to prolong indefinitely the existence of the individual. although on so many other points it has made so many successful efforts. Everything is as if this death had been willed or at least accepted for the greater progress of life in general". (C. E. 247, note) "That matter that it (the life current) bears along with it, and in the interstices of which it inserts itself, alone can divide it into distinct individualities. On flows the current, running through human generations subdividing itself into individuals. This subdivision was vaguely indicated in it, but could not have been made clear without matter. Thus souls are continually being created which nevertheless in a certain sense preexisted. They are nothing else than the little rills into which the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the body of humanity." (C. E. 269)

"As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with out entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organized beings from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles perhaps, even death". (C. E. 271)

From these quotations we see what we have already seen so many times in considering Bergson, the ascending current of this vital impulse contending with the descending current of materiality in an effort to insinuate into it as much indetermination as possible. In this is is but partially successful. However, as a result of the effort, human beings are formed who are loaded with matter and riveted to matter. These human beings have their individuality by virtue of this bodily organism. They had a certain preexistence in the life current, but not individuality. This became theirs only when they were thrown off into matter as rills from the life current, apart from these bodily conditions, the only thing that seems to be for them is to be reabsorbed in the life current, and this life current, which has succeeded do well in many other ways, seems to have no special desire or interest in maintaining this relation to the bodily organism which constitutes the human individual. Its interest as a life current would seem, according to Bergson, to be better served by this bit or

part of itself, which it has thrown off into a bodily organism, being reabsorbed into itself again. This withdrawing itself from the bodily organism is what we call death. The only hope of these beings or rills maintaining their individuality is, that somehow, as in a mighty cavalry charge, they may overcome and beat down all obstacles and prevent this reabsorption or death or retard it and delay it as long as possible. From all this, if we understand Bergson's figures aright, for he is here very profuse in figures, he conceives that it might be possible somehow to continue this bodily existence forever if we can only spiritualize matter, turn back the descending material current. But so far the vital impulse has only partially succeeded in this and at best has only retarded its descent for a time, as the live stream does the condensed descending drops. Failing to do anything else it has withdrawn from matter and been reabsorbed into itself. Bergson's idea of immortality then seems to be a forever continued bodily existence which so far has been impossible. Failing in this the best he has to offer is reabsorption in the main current and loss of personal identity. Then the current sweeps on all and alone, having swallowed up all its creatures as the sea swallows its waves. It is not a very inspiring hope that Bergson's system holds out. We have little prospect of being able to outride bodily death very long however furiously we may make the charge. Failing in this sooner or later, as all have done, matter falls, the little rill is dried up, the sea has taken back its water, the vital current has taken back the bit of life and we are no more as individual persons, unless, as a bit of the current, we are incarnated again in some organism, plant, animal or man.

The world ground and God of Bowne is personal, and human beings

are His children and are also personal. They are His creation. Their individuality is not bodily but spiritual. Their individuality is their personality. The soul of man and his body are related in the sense that the body is the instrument of the soul. Each conditions and effects the other, but there is no reason to believe that God destroys the soul when the body fails and dies. Individuality and personality being spiritual and not of the bodily why should we believe that the God, who created this soul, this individual or person, and for a time gives it a bodily organism for its earthly existence, will destry it when the bodily organism is destroyed? This soul is not a little rill thrown off from the nature of God as from a great river, but is His distinct creation. If it preexisted, it did not preexist in God as the rill preexists in the river, but it preexisted in His great plan and purpose and is His outright creation in His own image. Bowne's personal philosophy leads easily and naturally to this conclusion. It is not something he forces into his system. His philosophy of personalism naturally consummates in the thought of God as Father and human beings as His children, whom He has begotten in His own image and whom He will not destroy or blot out when the bodily organism no longer serves the needs of His spiritual child. Bowne's faith and hope in immortality, growing directly out of his philosophy, were strong. For him, death had no sting and no fear. It meant to him not the being blotted but more distinct individuality, richer personality, more abundant life. In a funeral address he said, "We see death only from the outside. The body, which has been the means of expression and communication, ceases its work, and we say our friend is dead. But this only means that we have no further intercourse with him. There is no answering pressure of the hand, and the loving voice is still. Yet

our friend lives, nevertheless; for all live unto God. Somewhere in God's kingdom he is engaged in the activities and has the experiences which belong to that unseen realm. And all the while he and we are in the hands of our Father.

Love met us and prepared the way when we came into this life; similarly love meets us when we pass into the next life and prepares the way for us there. Death, then, is only an incident in the existence of an immortal spirit, a passage from a lower to a higher phase of our continuous life. All the successive phases of this life of ours are comprised in the divine thought, and are gathered up in one great plan of love and wisdom.

IX. Bergson and the Social Problems

The supreme test of any philosophy is its ability to deal satisfactorily with the experiences and problems of every day life. The acid test, "By their fruits ye shall know them", is as applicable to systems of philosophy as to persons. To fail in dealing with the world of experience is to fail just when they should succeed. To my mind nothing so reveals the insufficiency of Bergson's philosophy as his application of it to the social problems. As a closet affair, it is one thing; as method of explaining and dealing with daily affairs among men it is altogether another matter. This test applied by Bergson himself makes this one of the most unsatisfactory chapters in this essay. But he himself is responsible for it. We will let him speak for himself. He shall be judged out of his own mouth. His own words here sustain what we have been saying about his system.

What then has "The Philosophy of Change" to say of the social problems? How does Bergson conceive of them, their nature, cause and solution? How would he himself apply his system to them? These questions naturally suggest themselves. From what we have seen of Bergson's interpretation of life we feel that we know quite well what his system would permit him to say upon these as well as upon other subjects. Fortunately (or unfortunately) he himself has spoken on this very matter in an address before the French Academy of Moral and Political Science dealing with the European war. In this address he holds to the theory of the vital impetus or life current divided into two opposing currents, one of intellectuality and materiality and the other of spirituality. These two currents or forces of matter and spirit are in terrible, deadly conflict. Of course Germany is intellect and

matter, and the allies are spirit, because Bergson is a Frenchman. Spirit is trying to turn back matter and insinuate into it as much indetermination as possible. It is of the very nature of matter in its downward course to oppose spirit in its upward course. As reported by the Paris Figaro and translated for the Literary Digest of January 23, 1915, he said: "We see in the present climax of events the death grapple between an intelligence of perfect mechanism and an intelligence of the spirit. Man's magic craftsmanship with the scientific and mechanical arts suddenly greatly enlarged his physical being - so suddenly that his soul has not kept pace with it. Certain moral and social problems resulted, to solve which most of the world bent its energies. But there were those who were tempted to try the experiment not of spiritualization of matter, but of the mechanization of mind. Thus, instead of attaining to a higher civilization through our mastery of science, the peoples of the earth would be subjected to a new barbarism worse than the original, which at least contained the germ of civilization. The German nation, militarized by the Prussians, was predestined to make this venture. Many years to come, when the present has withdrawn so far into the past that one can see only the larger outlines of these days, a philosopher will perchance analyze them as follows: He will say that the notable idea of the nineteenth century to employ science for the satisfaction of our material needs had given the mechanical arts an unexpected range and procured for man in less than fifty years more tools than he had made in the thousands of years he had hitherto passed on earth. Each new machine was a new organ for man - an artificial organ, to prolong the term of his natural organs. In consequence, his body became suddenly and prodigiously enlarged, and his soul could not dilate rapidly enough entirely to

contain this new body. Out of the disproportion rose moral, social, and international problems, which the majority of peoples sought to solve by removing discrepancies, by working toward greater liberty, greater fraternity, and greater justice than world had ever before known. Then while humanity was engaged in this great work of civilization, inferior powers - I had almost said 'infernal' - were trying the inverse experiment.

"What would happen if the mechanical forces which had been brought to the point where they could be put at the service of man should master him and convert him into their materiality? What would become of the world if this mechanism should take possession of all humanity, and if the races, instead of lifting themselves freely to a diversity richer and more harmonious, as persons, should sink into uniformity, as things? What would a society be like that obeyed automatically an order automatically transmitted; which should rule with its science and its view of things, and which should have lost with the sense of justice the idea of truth? What would such a humanity be like in which brute force obtained instead of moral force? What new barbarism, this time a definitive one, would result to stifle sentiments, idea, in a word, civilization, which ancient barbarism held in the germ? What would happen, to sum up finally, if the moral effort of humanity should turn upon itself at the moment it reached its term, and if by some diabolical artifice it should produce, instead of a spiritualization of matter, a mechanization of mind?

"The Germans were predestined to prove the experiment. Here was a powerful nation whose administrative and military mechanism became, with the combination of the industrial mechanism, a machine capable of subjugating other peoples and making them prisoners of the

mechanism that controlled Germany. This would be the precise meaning of war, whenever Germany was ready to declare it. She did declare war, but the result was quite different from what she expected. The moral forces that were to be subjected to that power of nearest kin to matter suddenly revealed themselves as creators of material force. A simple idea, the heroic conception of a little people as to what honor was, enabled it to hold up its head before a mighty Empire. At the cry of outraged justice, there sprang from the soil, in a land that had hitherto depended on its fleet, one million, two millions, of soldiers; in a nation believed to be mortally rent within itself, from one day to the next all became brothers.

"Thenceforward the issue was not in doubt. On one side there was the force spread upon the surface; on the other, the force drawn from deep roots. On one side, the mechanism, the thing all made, which cannot repair itself; on the other, life, power of creation, which makes and remakes itself at each instant. On one side, that which exhausts itself; on the other, that which does not. In truth, the machine did exhaust itself. Long it resisted, slowly it toppled, then suddenly fell to pieces. Under it, alas, many of our children were crusht; and over the fate of these youths, who were so naturally and so simply the most heroic of all youths, we still shed our tears...

"An implacable law insists that the spirit must set itself against the resistance of matter, that no advance be made in life except at the cost of life, and that great moral results are bought at the cost of much blood and many tears. But this time the sacrifice shall be as fruitful as it has been beautiful. That they might measure up with life in a supreme combat, destiny had brought together at one point all the powers of death - and lo, death was vanquished. Through material suffering, humanity was saved from the moral fall

that would have meant the end. Joyous in their desolation, amid mourning and ruin, the nations intoned the song of deliverance."

Here is plainly evident the same idea of the life current, its ascent and descent, its material and spiritual natures and their conflict, which we have noted so many times in Bergson's philosophy. Here again the principle of necessity which also we have noted many times in Bergson's system. He openly expresses it. "Germany was predestined to make this venture". She is so materialized, so completely in the grip of matter that she could not do otherwise. She is the falling black rocket that in vain the ascending burning rocket, the allies, struggles.with. She is the condensed, falling steam with which the live steam, the allies, can only retard but not turn into live rising steam again. She is the interrupted current which has been turned back and against the spiritual current, the allies. But why is she predestined any more than the allies? They, the rising spiritual current, are as surely predestined to do what they are doing, for it is the mighty pushing of the vital impulse that is driving all along as a furious, terrible, cavalry charge. All are predestined, the Germans, as matter, to fall and oppose the allies, and the allies, as spirit, to rise and oppose the Germans. The one is no more to be praised than the other is to be blamed. The inherent nature of matter is to tend downward, it is naturally evil. The inherent nature of spirit is to tend upward, it is naturally good. But when predestination rules, moral distinctions drop out. Hence in this case as in all others we have irresponsible forces in deadly combat and none can praise and none can blame. It must be so. These things must need come but we cannot say "Woe unto them through whom they come", for they could not do otherwise. This war need excite no

wonder or surprise. We may expect anything to happen according to Bergson's system with its plurality of contending forces having no over ruling and directing power guiding them to an end according to a plan of the whole. But according to him all is order, if not one kind, then another. It is all in the way we look at it.

According to Bergson's theory of matter, the outlook for the allies is dark. For the best that the rising current of spirit so far has been able to do with the falling current of matter is not to turn it back but for a time to retard it. Sooner or later it continues its downward course. The rising current is limited. It fain would do much more and otherwise, but it is not able. Matter and intellect dominate except at those rare, brief intervals when spirit has right of way and there is freedom. This rushing, pushing vital impulse as in a mighty cavalry charge may overcome all difficulties and beat down every obstacle, and conquer all enemies - even death itself, but so far it has not been able to do so. Will it be able to do so in this war? Bergson evidently thinks it will. Of course if Bergson were a German the order of these warring nations would doubtless be reversed. So it turns out to be a matter of view point or nationality as to which is spirit and which matter. Were he a German there is every reason to believe that order would be reversed, the Germans would be spirit and the allies, intellect and matter. But no sufficient philosophy can be a matter of personal, private, selfish interpretation. It must be as applicable to one side as the other, as sufficient for one as the other. It must equally include all without selfish prejudice.

There is every reason to believe that the interpretation Bergson has given this war is the interpretation he would give all social questions. All turn out to be a terrible conflict between matter

and spirit which has been brought about by some interrupter, some adversary, some Satan. Bergson's pluralism is here manifest and he is unable to solve these problems, to manage these clashing forces, these blind Samsons in deadly combat. The kingdom of his God inspires little enthusiasm and hope. It is but the terrific clash of vital but unpersonal forces.

Bowne may not be any more than Bergson to furnish a definite detailed solution for these problems of society, but by giving us a personal world ground, who is God the Father, who is infinite, righteous, wise and good, and holds all things in the grasp of His power, he makes possible a way of looking at these problems which begets hope and courage. The God of Bowne has not been thrown into conflict within Himself by some external interruption. Matter is His as well as spirit and He is able to make them work together for good. The world has not gotten away from Him nor been taken from Him, so that in His finiteness and externally imposed limitation there is much He fain would do but is unable. Such a God and condition is far different from mighty, but finite, limited forces clashing and grinding and destroying with no plan or purpose like mighty beasts fighting in the dark trying to work out a modus vivendi. It is the God of Jesus in whom Bowne's philosophy more and more led him to believe that brings light to these dark, perplexing problems. "In Him was life and the life was the light of men". "As many as received Him to them He gave the power to become the children of God," It is in this God, not Bergson's, that we find hope.

If we accept Bergson's idea of God, the terrible conditions in Europe should excite no wonder. They are what we should most

naturally expect with his two mighty currents struggling in conflict with one another. Harmony and peace would be the rare, yea, impossible, exception. That there should be ferocious and deadly struggle and conflict in men and in society and in nature would be the normal condition of affairs. Nietzsche would be vindicated. The wonder would be that conditions are as good as they are and not tenfold worse.

But we can not admit such a God and such conditions without doing violence to our nature, our very being, without surrendering our ideals. We know such conditions should not exist, hence we justly condemn them. It is the God of Bowne that we turn to save ourselves and the world. He is our hope. To Him will we pray, for pray and hope we must. In Him and not in a center of shooting out, a flowing, a stream of clashing forces, do we find power to live and work out our salvation, to serve, to sacrifice, to suffer, and to die in hope. Bergson's God cannot save Himself, why then should we look to Him for help? His God is struggling in a process of becoming and is doing the best He can, all He can. He cannot deliver us. It is the God of Bowne, who can answer the cry of the soul from its depths. "Our help cometh from God who made heaven and earth and all that is in them," the God who is our personal Father. He is our hope for the kingdom of righteousness, peace and joy.

X. Elements of Value in Bergson

It might seem from the preceeding chapters that we find little or nothing in Bergson's philosophy to commend. Such is not the case. It contains much worth while. We have attempted to point out the elements of weakness. These, according to Bowne's system, are cardinal. If Bergson comes to personalism most of what has been said loses its force. But so long and so far as he remains on the impersonal or unpersonal plane we hold the foregoing objections valid. It is noticeable that those who find most in Bergson to commend seem to assume that his philosophy is personal or becoming so. Bowne himself, as we have already stated, felt that Bergson's system would finally become personal if he would consistently complete his philosophy. As long as elan vital is other than a person his system is mechanical, consequently deterministic, nor can it be otherwise. It is a system of becoming and will not be sufficient until it becomes fundamentally personal. His tendency seems to be toward the personal, as Bowne used that term. The personal continually gets into his philosophy. It is because he thus slips over into the personal and consciously or unconsciously brings in the personal as cause or result that his system has such strength.

In the light of this we will mention three great values of his philosophy. There are others, but these will suffice to indicate his strength and point where we may expect help from him in the future.

First, he starts, not with matter force and motion, but with life, vital impulse, as the fundamental cause of all things. This is a great advance. Gross materialism is rules out as insufficient. No man has more surely given the death blow to Spencer and others of the materialistic shhool than Bergson has done. He has cut away all their

ground. He shows conclusively that matter, force and motion can never account for life, intelligence, spirit. This a contribution is of great value to philosophy. He has done this so thoroughly that it need not be done again. In this he is at one with Bowne who did this same work with equal if not greater effectiveness, years ago.

But, as we have contended, vital impulse does not go far enough; it is not sufficient to account for intelligence personality. If matter, force and motion are insufficient as the God and Creator of all things, so is vital impulse, so long and so far as it comes short of personality, i.e. self consciousness and self direction. The same objections Bergson brings against matter, force and motion are largely valid against vital impulse. While the chasm between matter, force and motion and spiritual life, i.e. personality, may be greater than the chasm between vital impulse and personality, the latter chasm is just as difficult to bridge from the side of vital impulse as from that of matter, force and motion. In both cases we land in the bottomless abyss. Vital impulse is an advance but it stops short. It is kind of a half-way place. As matter force and motion can not save even themselves, far less the universe, but must be saved by personality, so neither can vital impulse save itslef and the universe. No man is more able than Bergson to show. Now it is sufficient for these things, but even he has not yet done so, nor can he do so, according to Bowne. We can never get back to materialism with the work which Bergson has done. We trust he will soon pass on from vitalism to personalism as the only sufficient system.

Second, his doctrine of change recognizes and seeks to make a place for growth, productivity, novelty. He recognizes the facts of science and the needs of life. A system of rigid fixedness, whether absolute materialism or absolute idealism, will never do. A radical

finalism that closes all doors a head of us is as impossible to satisfy the needs of life as a gross materialism that closes all doors back of us. The latter would keep us from coming and the former keeps us from going. Stern identity would prevail. But the facts of life, all science, are against such identity. There is change and there must be change. The way must be kept open for progress, becoming and developments. This Bergson recognizes and mightily emphasizes. So anxious is he to provide a way for such change and becoming that he opens the door wide enough for everything and anything to happen. All is change, flux, becoming. What it will become there is no telling. It is not guided from before but it is mightily pushed from behind. Vital impulse is driving furiously with no goal in view. It seems nothing but purposeless change.

Bergson sees this and would correct it by introducing a certain degree of finality or purpose in this becoming. Thus he would save us from aimless becoming. Radical finalism, true, is radical determinism. No finalism is mere chance, chaos. Some finality indeed there must be. Purpose must be from the beginning or must ouse on the way, or all is but kaleido-scopic happenings. But now get any finality into such a system with vital impulse less than personality? Or how keep it from being rigidly determined if any determinism is admitted? Bergson gets in some purpose because consciously or unconsciously he smuggles personality into vital impulse. If personality is not in vital impulse from the beginning, it can not be gotten out of it any more than personality can be gotten out of matter, force and motion. Bowne rightly holds that personality and that alone is sufficient to provide for change and purpose, finality and progress. In personality alone we have sufficient identity to give firmness, steadiness, direction. In personality alone we have provision for change, becoming,

without its being groundless and purposeless.

Bergson has rendered more valuable service in his doctrine of change and finalism. Change there must be; purpose there must be. Although he has not made adequate provision for these in vital impulse, he has made us see and feel the problem as never before and has led along the way toward the solution and has pointed us toward the end which according to Bowne is personalism.

Third, Bergson's doctrine intuition, to my mind his greatest contribution, has put all philosophy and theology under obligation to him. Intuition, according to him, is knowing by immediate experience, by life in communion with life. As valuable and necessary as is knowledge gained by hearsay, by external ideas of intellect, by concepts, this knowledge is superficial, external, insufficient. Full, deep, vital knowledge can be gained only by intuition, by experience of reality, communion, fellowship with reality. We must enter into reality. It is not our grasping reality by concepts which are but snapshots of reality, but it is letting reality grasp us, take us into its embrace. This is possible. Thus we may know, may experience elan vital, thus only can we truly, fully, deeply know it, thus we experience it. The value of intuition to philosophy and especially to religion is apparent at once. The limits of intellectualism is made very evident and plain by Bergson. But he does not, as Kent and Spencer, land us in the darkness and despair of the unknowable. Kent of course tried to get us out because life demanded it, but the world of philosophy has never been satisfied with his deliverance. Certain kinds of mysticism have tried, but they left us suspended in mid air, unable to go up or come down. Bergson, by his doctrine intuition, has shown us how we may have deep, rich, vital knowledge of reality without violence to ourselves. Of course there is much yet to be done, but Bergson has set up

far on the way. He has given philosophic grounding to the doctrine of knowledge of God by experience, witness of the spirit, religious assurance. We may know God by personal experience, we may fellowship with Him, we may enjoy Him, we may know that He receives us, forgives, approves us. Our love for God and God's love for us, faith, the yielding of self to God, friendship with God the Father, the fundamental, primal Reality, the Creator must be philosophically recognized as possible and valid according to Bergson's doctrine of intuition. This deepens and enriches all life, knowledge and experience, and will abide as one of the greatest contributions ever made to philosophy.

These three principles in Bergson's system are of great and permanent worth. They are all away from materialism and toward spiritualism. They indicate the direction philosophy is taking. Bergson is surely moving toward personalism. He has certainly made it most difficult, if not entirely impossible, for philosophy go back of his system. He has made some positions forever untenable. If we can not rest in his present position, which his very doctrine of change precludes, we must go forward, and, if forward, whither but to personalism? No one has done more to make every other position untenable than Bergson

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